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The intersection between the U.S. military and technological innovation, a “military-innovation
nexus,” has led to the genesis of key technologies, including nuclear energy, general computing,
GPS, and satellite technology from World War II to the present. However, an evolving
innovation context in the twenty-first century, including the leadership of the commercial sector
in technology innovation and the resurgence of great power competition, has led to doubts about
the ability of the Department of Defense to discover and promote the technological innovations
of the future. The Third Offset Strategy was formulated in 2014 in response to these concerns:
The offset strategy promulgated reforms to bring the Pentagon and the commercial sector closer
together while creating alternative contracting mechanisms for streamlined procurement and
prototyping. Using defense biometrics and artificial intelligence as case studies of spin-on
innovations adopted by the military, this Article seeks to understand the efficacy of the reforms
undertaken under the auspices of the Third Offset Strategy to improve the institutional
underpinnings of the U.S. innovation system for national security. I argue that the Third Offset
Strategy has allowed the Pentagon to more effectively procure, develop, and field commercial
technologies in the twenty-first century, and I conclude by proposing modest recommendations
for the successful acquisition of spin-on innovations.
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1

I NT R O DU CT I O N
Since World War II, the U.S. military has played a critical, if often overlooked, role in
facilitating technological innovation. Tasked with providing the military forces to deter war and
to protect the security of the United States, the Department of Defense and its armed services
have pioneered new technologies to further American warfighting capabilities and maintain a
leading edge over competitor states.1 From the birth of nuclear energy through the Manhattan
Project in the 1940s to funding the construction of ENIAC, the first electronic general-purpose
computer in 1946, the U.S. military has often been at the forefront of funding, facilitating, and
adopting untested technologies.2 This connection between the U.S. military and technology
innovation, a “military-innovation nexus,” has not been accidental. The Department of Defense
is firmly embedded in the U.S. national innovation system, including historically close
relationships with academic research institutions and partnerships with leading defense
technology firms like Boeing and Lockheed Martin. The U.S. national innovation system for
defense-related R&D and procurement thus involves the innovation ecosystem of research
institutions, firms, and the armed services in a mutually-reinforcing network with the objective
of meeting the Pentagon’s national security technology needs.3 However, with consumer
technology firms increasingly driving the development of next-generation technologies in a
renewed environment of great power competition4, is the Pentagon still capable of discovering
and promoting the technological innovations of the future? In this Article, I will explore and
challenge this assumption by describing the changing twenty-first century context of military
innovation, analyzing the cases of defense biometrics and artificial intelligence through the lens
of the Third Offset Strategy, and proposing modest recommendations for the successful
acquisition of spin-on innovations.
Whenever potential foes develop advanced military capabilities, defense leaders have
pursued top-down “offset strategies” to foster innovation and secure U.S. superiority.5
Retroactively referred to as the “First Offset,” President Eisenhower set the stage for coordinated
military technology innovation with his “New Look” policy in 1956. The “New Look” was a
defense doctrine which articulated the use of advanced nuclear weapons to counter the numerical

1
2

See “About The Department of Defense (DoD).” Accessed March 29, 2020. https://archive.defense.gov/about/.

See “ENIAC at Penn Engineering.” Accessed March 29, 2020. https://www.seas.upenn.edu/about/history-heritage/eniac/; Steinbock, Dan. “The
Erosion of America’s Defense Innovation.” American Foreign Policy Interests 36, no. 6 (November 2, 2014): 366–74.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2014.993251.
3
Mowery, David C. 2009. "National Security and National Innovation Systems." The Journal of Technology Transfer 34 (5): 455-473.
doi:10.1007/s10961-008-9100-4.
4
Lynn (2014); See Friedman, Uri. “The New Concept Everyone in Washington Is Talking About.” The Atlantic, August 6, 2019.
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/what-genesis-great-power-competition/595405/.; Mitchell, A. Wess, and Elbridge A.
Colby. “The Age of Great-Power Competition.” Foreign Affairs, April 16, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-12-10/age-greatpower-competition.
5
See Felter, Joseph. “It’s Not Just The Technology: Beyond Offset Strategies.” Text. Hoover Institution. Accessed March 30, 2020.
https://www.hoover.org/research/its-not-just-technology-beyond-offset-strategies.

2
superiority of the Soviet Union’s standing army.6 By the Vietnam War, when it became apparent
that the Soviet Union had reached nuclear parity with the United States, a “Second Offset”
strategy was formulated around a series of promising new technologies including precisionguided missiles, the Global Positioning System (GPS), reconnaissance satellites, and stealth
aircraft.7 Investment in and adoption of these emerging technologies spurred a new period of
American military superiority, demonstrated by the overwhelming U.S. victory in the 1990-1991
Gulf War.8
However, in the decades following the Gulf War, America’s competitor states have
actively invested in innovative defense technologies of their own. Russia and China sought to
modernize their military capabilities after the startling ease with which the United States
defeated Iraqi forces during the Gulf War.9 They have invested in anti-satellite weapons,
hypersonic missiles, and other asymmetric technologies to obviate the threat of America’s
conventional military strengths. For example, the aircraft carrier, a traditional symbol of U.S.
military might, is threatened by Chinese innovation in anti-ship missile technology. Navy
strategists believe that China has successfully developed two missiles capable of destroying
American carriers: the Dongfeng-21D and the YJ-12.10 The strategic consequence of this
development is the risk that the US aircraft carriers would be rendered useless in the event of a
conflict in the South China Sea, for example, due to fears that they would be successfully
destroyed. At the same time, while the U.S. has been involved in counter-terrorism initiatives in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the focus of the Pentagon’s leaders has shifted away from long-term,
disruptive innovation to technologies like surveillance drones that are applicable to countering
militant insurgencies but are less useful in great power conflict.
The contextual landscape for the U.S. national innovation system has also experienced
significant changes since the late twentieth century. We can trace shifts in this innovation
landscape as early as the 1970s, when the development of a technology of critical importance to
the Pentagon — semiconductors — was being increasingly driven by the market demands of
large commercial users.11 Why was this the case? Defense contractors found their market share
of the semiconductor industry slipping from 50% in the mid-1960s to less than 10% by the late
1970s, undermining their ability to entice semiconductor firms to do military work: "We were
forced to use decade-old microelectronic technology," complained one Pentagon official, "while

6

See “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs | Miller Center,” October 4, 2016. https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/foreign-affairs.
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See “Who’s Afraid of America?” The Economist. Accessed March 29, 2020. https://www.economist.com/international/2015/06/13/whos-afraidof-america.
8
See U.S. Department of Defense. “Deputy Secretary: Third Offset Strategy Bolsters America’s Military Deterrence.” Accessed March 29, 2020.
9

Ibid

10

See Broder, Jonathan. “What China’s New Missiles Mean for the Future of the Aircraft Carrier.” Newsweek, February 16, 2016.
https://www.newsweek.com/china-dongfeng-21d-missile-us-aircraft-carrier-427063.
11
Stowsky, Jay. “From Spin-Off to Spin-On: Redefining the Military's Role in Technology Development.” UC Berkeley: Berkeley Roundtable
on the International Economy, 1992. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0tf8v3c7.
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Atari games were using the latest."12 Moreover, while major U.S. defense companies like
Raytheon and Boeing continue to service the Pentagon’s military technology needs, they are no
longer the driving engines of innovation they once were. As Lynn (2014) discusses, these firms
transitioned from diversified conglomerates with both defense and commercial operations to a
handful of defense-only companies.13 The transition was brought about by industry consolidation
in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union contributed to a precipitous decline in U.S. military
spending. Today, large commercial technology firms (e.g. Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, etc.)
surpass defense contractors in technology R&D spending, as consumer tech firms are pioneering
next-generation innovations like artificial intelligence, 5G, and autonomous vehicles. For
example, it was initially Google, and not a traditional major defense contractor, which was
awarded the Project Maven contract to help the armed services use machine learning to analyze
drone footage.14 These shifts have led the Pentagon to become a net purchaser, rather than the
traditional net producer, of next-generation commercial technologies.15 In other words, the
Department of Defense is co-opting civilian-developed consumer technologies for warfighting
purposes. This channel is that of the “spin-on,” which Stowsky (1992) defines as the diffusion of
technology from the civilian to the defense sector.16
Faced with the advancing capabilities of “competitor states” and a changing innovation
context, American war planners and policymakers are now asking an essential question: Is the
United States facing a crisis of innovation? Beginning under Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel,
both Congress and the Department of Defense have pursued institutional and policy reforms to
improve the military’s tech innovation capabilities. Initially formulated around the ethos of a
“Third Offset Strategy*” in 2014, reforms emphasized building relationships with the
commercial sector while lowering barriers to doing business.17 For example, the Defense
Innovation Unit (DIU) was founded in 2015 as an investing arm for the Pentagon in potentially
strategic emerging spin-on technologies, designed to facilitate partnerships with commercial tech
starts in Silicon Valley and other hubs like Austin and Boston.18 Moreover, statutory authority to
accelerate contracting and provide alternative ways to engage with potential commercial partners

12

Julian, Ken, “Defense Program Pushes Microchip Frontiers,” High Technology, May 1985, pp. 49-56

13

See William J. III Lynn, "The End of the Military-Industrial Complex: How the Pentagon Is Adapting to Globalization," Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 6 (November/December 2014): 104-[vi]
14
Statt, Nick. “Google Reportedly Leaving Project Maven Military AI Program after 2019.” The Verge, June 1, 2018.
https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/1/17418406/google-maven-drone-imagery-ai-contract-expire.
15
Ibid; See Director of Defense Research & Engineering. 2008 Department of Defense Research and Engineering: Strategic Basic Research
Plan. U.S. Department of Defense: Office of Defense Research and Engineering, 2008. p.3.
16
Stowsky (1992)
17

*Origins of the Third Offset Strategy attributed to the Defense Innovation Initiative announced by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel at the
2014 Reagan Defense Forum; See Manea, Octavian. “The Third Offset Strategy in Historical Context.” Small Wars Journal, 2015.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-third-offset-strategy-in-historical-context.
U.S. Department of Defense. “Deputy Secretary: Third Offset Strategy Bolsters America’s Military Deterrence.”
18
See Hempel, Jessi. “DoD Head Ashton Carter Enlists Silicon Valley to Transform the Military.” Wired, November 18, 2015.
https://www.wired.com/2015/11/secretary-of-defense-ashton-carter/.
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was expanded, such as the Other Transaction Authority (OTA) and Commercial Solutions
Opening (CSO).19
Recent academic literature (Light, 2014; Gholz, 2014) has focused on the role that the
Department of Defense can play in mitigating climate change through an innovation strategy.
This “Military-Environmental Complex” is founded on the alignment of U.S. national security
priorities and environmental policy.20 Reducing energy demand and encouraging the
development of renewable sources are critical to the U.S. warfighting mission.21 Acknowledging
the harmony between these objectives and the preservation of the environment, Light (2014)
proposes how the Military-Environmental Complex has the potential to promote innovative
green technologies and processes aligned with U.S. national security while providing large-scale
commercial support for existing technologies. For example, the Strategic Environmental
Research and Development Program (SERDP) is the Department of Defense’s environmental
science and technology program. The DoD, in partnership with the Department of Energy and
the Environmental Protection Agency, invests in basic and applied research for solutions to its
environmental challenges. In this context, innovation is arguably both spin-off and spin-on.
SERDP funds novel solutions to environmental challenges facing the DoD, which can then be
co-opted for civilian applications, but the program also invites contractors to modify (or adapt)
existing technologies and processes developed for the commercial economy to national security
purposes.22
Ultimately, both the “crisis of U.S. military innovation” and the thesis on the “MilitaryEnvironmental Complex” motivated the research question that will be explored in this Article, as
both must wrestle with the question of whether the Pentagon is still capable of discovering and
promoting the technological innovations of the future. I am interested in exploring and
challenging this assumption by understanding the changing twenty-first century context of
technological innovation. This Article will seek to examine the institutional and policy reforms
undertaken under the auspices of the Third Offset Strategy to determine their impact on the
ability of the U.S. national innovation system to identify and facilitate the development of novel
technologies. Stakeholders — such as the CEO of the National Security Technology Accelerator
and a collection of former acquisition officials — have begun to question the efficacy of some of
these reforms, including concerns over the Pentagon’s focus on tech firms in Silicon Valley and
a new “commercialization valley of death” being created by new transaction authorities

19

See Procurement Innovation Resource Center. “Commercial Solutions Opening Guide.” GSA.org. U.S. General Services Administration, June
1, 2018. https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstatic/PIRC CSO Guide 62518.pdf.
20
Light, Sarah E. “The Military-Environmental Complex.” Boston College Law Review, May 2014.
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol55/iss3/5.
21
Brosig, Max, Parker Frawley, Andrew Hill, Molly Jahn, Michael Marsicek, Aubrey Paris, Matthew Rose, Amar Shambaljamts, and Nicole
Thomas. “Implications of Climate Change for the U.S. Army.” U.S. Army War College, July 2019., 52.
22
See Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program. “About SERDP and ESTCP.” Accessed March 29, 2020.
https://www.serdp-estcp.org/About-SERDP-and-ESTCP.
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preventing the fielding of technologies for warfighting after their initial prototyping.23 Using the
conceptual framework of the U.S. national innovation system for defense-related R&D and
procurement, I will analyze the successful development, procurement, and fielding of automated
biometrics during the War on Terror and explore the Pentagon’s pursuit of artificial intelligence
for warfighting using a case study methodology.
Research Significance
Understanding the efficacy of the Third Offset Strategy and recent reforms undertaken to
improve the institutional underpinnings of the U.S. innovation system for national security is of
critical importance to both Congressional policymakers and stakeholders at the Department of
Defense responsible for maintaining and promoting military innovation. The Senate Committee
on the Armed Forces and the House Armed Services Committee are the principal legislative
bodies with jurisdiction over the Department of Defense and the military branches. These
committees are responsible for spearheading recent changes in procurement and contracting (e.g.
Other Transaction Authority, Commercial Solutions Opening procedure) to more rapidly acquire
new technologies for military applications. However, no systematic analysis or research has yet
been performed to gauge the impact of these new procedures for defense contracting.
Similarly, existing literature (Christiansson, 2017; Freeman et. al., 2015) remains only
inchoate on new Pentagon institutions for “spin-on” innovation, such as the Defense Innovation
Unit, which transitioned from an experimental program to a permanent status in 2017.
Understanding the effectiveness of DIU and other new units will better inform sound
policymaking on U.S. military innovation while gauging the success of existing tactics to better
respond to the 21st century innovation context. In a greater sense, both the Department of
Defense and Congress are concerned with maintaining U.S. military technology superiority over
competitor states like China and Russia, which have been rapidly building up their own
asymmetric capabilities. My research will be useful toward a greater understanding of this “crisis
of innovation,” guiding policy efforts toward maintaining the United States’ advantage in
military innovation.
Less immediately, the ecosystem of firms constituting the national innovation system also
stand to benefit from further reforms to improve the efficiency and ease of DoD procurement,
contracting, and investment. There could be an expanded window of opportunity for small
businesses and tech startups outside of the traditional Silicon Valley hub to work with the
Pentagon, for example. Moreover, a national innovation system more responsive to the twenty-

23

See Gray, Gary, William Riski, and George Schleh. “Accelerating DoD Systems Fielding While Avoiding a New 'Valley of Death'.” Federal
News Network, July 31, 2019. https://federalnewsnetwork.com/commentary/2019/07/accelerating-dod-systems-fielding-while-avoiding-a-newvalley-of-death/.; Greef, Tim. “The Pentagon Is Losing the Innovation Battle. Here's How to Turn It Around.” Defense One, April 30, 2018.
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/04/pentagon-losing-innovation-battle-heres-how-turn-it-around/147821/?oref=d1-related-articl.
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first century innovation context could better drive civilian adoption of traditional “spin-off”
innovations promoted and funded by the Department of Defense. Lastly, arguments being made
for a “Military-Environmental Complex” are founded upon the historical role the Pentagon has
played in promoting technological innovations like the internet and GPS; my research will
provide a theoretical grounding for these arguments in a 21st century innovation context rather
than in the Cold War-era from which these technologies initially sprung.
1.

L I T E R AT U RE RE VI E W

This Article proceeds in six Parts. Part I provides the theoretical framework for this
Article. It elaborates on prior literature written on military innovation and presents the concept of
the U.S. national innovation system for defense-related R&D and procurement. Part II is an
overview of the Third Offset Strategy and recent reforms undertaken to improve defense-related
technology acquisition, including new units like the Defense Innovation Unit and contracting
vehicles (e.g. Other Transaction Authority). Part III discusses the case study methodology that
will be used for this Article, including the rationale behind it for conducting research in the
social sciences. Part IV is devoted to the first case, defense biometrics, and charts its historical
development as a spin-on innovation during the Global War on Terror. Lessons are drawn with
implications for military innovation generally and the Third Offset Strategy. This analysis is then
brought forward to the second case — artificial intelligence (AI) — which is discussed in Part V.
This Part discusses the Pentagon’s mission to bring AI capabilities to the armed services,
defining AI and charting the course of its procurement thus far. Lastly, Part VI concludes the
Article with insights gleaned from the stories of defense biometrics and artificial intelligence,
and it offers recommendations on how to best proceed with the Third Offset Strategy, especially
as it relates to artificial intelligence, the next great technology frontier. These recommendations
focus on the dynamics of the spin-on process after contracting: The importance of a guiding
framework or ideology for the translation of a new innovation to warfighting, rapid prototyping
in a “natural experiment” setting, organizational dynamics promoting experimentation and
creativity, and awareness of non-institutional factors like military ethics which can impede
technology development.
1.2

The U.S. National Innovation System: A Conceptual Framework

The U.S. military has historically played an important role in identifying, funding, and
facilitating the adoption of new technologies. Mowery (2009, 2010) surveys the U.S. national
innovation system for defense-related R&D innovation and investment, identifying key industry
sectors which the Department of Defense promoted during and after the Cold War.24 To begin,
the “national system of innovation” (NSI) framework for analyzing innovation performance and
policy has been a part of the scholarship for analyzing innovation performance and policy for
24

Mowery (2009)
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over 20 years since the first articulation of the concept in Freeman (1987).25 National innovation
systems are defined as the institutions, policies, and actors that affect the creation of knowledge,
the innovation processes that translate research into applications (commercial or non-market),
and the processes that influence the adoption of innovations.26 Thus, the alignment between the
U.S. national innovation system and national security focuses on the role the Department of
Defense has played in the U.S. national innovation system and the policies underlying it.
Mowery (2009, 2010)’s framework of a national system for U.S. military innovation, and the
potential for both policy-driven and institutional change, will provide the theoretical basis of this
Article.
Mowery and Rosenberg (1993)’s paper on the U.S. national innovation system began a
discussion of the role of defense spending on R&D and procurement. A later study, Mowery
(2009, 2010), discusses three channels from which public investments in defense-related R&D
and procurement impact the innovative performance of either industrial sectors or the economy
as a whole. The first is most tied to the “R” of R&D; investments in basic and applied research
can both support the discovery of new scientific and engineering knowledge and the
development of the institutional constituents of national innovation systems (e.g. universitybased research). The second channel is the “spin-off” of defense-related innovations for civilian
applications (e.g. GPS, the early internet). Procurement is the third channel, where the
Department of Defense plays the role of a “lead purchaser” for new technologies. Consequently,
supplier firms are able to refine their cost structure and product performance and reliability while
contracting with the Pentagon. It is important to note that there can be significant overlap across
these three channels in real life, with the Pentagon at times pursuing multiple strategies
simultaneously. For example, the U.S. semiconductor industry is often cited as an example of a
heavy beneficiary of public investment in both initial R&D for technology development and then
procurement upon its maturity, with the military helping to prove the market for an untried
technology.27
1.3

The Contextual Landscape: Innovation in the 21st Century

How has the contextual landscape for the U.S. national innovation system for defenserelated R&D and procurement evolved over the past several decades? One of the most significant
changes has been what I will refer to as a “fourth channel.” This channel is that of the “spin-on”
which Alic et al. (1992), Samuels (1994), and Stowsky (1992) define as the diffusion of
technology from the civilian to the defense sector. In other words, military-relevant technologies

25

See Godin, Benoît. “National Innovation System: A Note on the Origins of a Concept,” Project on the Intellectual History of Innovation, 2010,

8.
26
27

Mowery (2009)

Mowery, David C. “Chapter 29 - Military R&D and Innovation.” In Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edited by Bronwyn H. Hall
and Nathan Rosenberg, 2:1219–56. Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Volume 2. North-Holland, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1016/S01697218(10)02013-7.
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are first developed and refined for commercial applications and later adapted for military-use.
This is the inverse of the traditional “spin-off” approach to defense-related R&D, where
technology initially developed for defense applications is re-purposed for general market use.
When Stowsky (1991) conducted his study, spin-on was only just becoming a part of the
defense-related R&D toolkit; it is now a fourth channel in its own right. Indeed, Mowery (2009)
touches upon spin-on as "the need [of the military services] to reform both R&D and
procurement programs so as to exploit advances in civilian applications more rapidly.”28 It is
important to distinguish “spin-on” as its own channel from conventional materials procurement;
the latter can be understood as the simple purchase of existing items from the marketplace (e.g.
new military hardware, upgrades to existing equipment, weapons and ammunition, etc.) without
its explicit adaptation for military-specific purposes.29 Practically, the DoD and lawmakers use
procurement to generally refer to a specific title within the annual National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) and defense appropriations legislation, which entitles the Pentagon
to make purchases appropriated by Congress.30
Lynn (2014) further discusses the contextual changes surrounding the U.S. national
innovation system for national security, going as far as to sound “the end of the MilitaryIndustrial Complex.”31 While the true extent of this characterization can be disputed, Lynn
(2014) does precisely identify key changes in R&D dynamics that he considers to be a new,
“fourth era” for the national innovation system. The “third era” the Department of Defense has
now moved beyond was the era of consolidation, in which the industry shifted from diversified
conglomerates with their own commercial divisions to a smaller cohort of defense-only firms. In
the fourth era, U.S. defense companies (and the Department of Defense, by extension) lag far
behind large commercial companies in technology R&D, becoming a net importer for the first
time of next-generation commercial technology. It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
for the major U.S. defense firms to catch up; the Pentagon’s R&D budget has fallen as companyfunded R&D spending at top U.S. defense firms has declined from 3.5% to 2% of sales from
2000 to 2012, compared to 8% of sales devoted to R&D at peer commercial companies.32 Lynn
(2014) also devotes attention to the imperative of globalizing the national innovation system for
national security. Taken together, Lynn (2014) lays the groundwork for the contextual changes
facing the national innovation system. Thus, while Lynn’s “fourth era” focused on the
relationships that constitute the national innovation system for defense, the aforementioned
“fourth channel” of the “spin-on” describes a specific feature of that system which he predicts

28

Mowery (2009) touches upon “spin-on” as being a channel worth future study in the years ahead, but he is predominantly concerned with the
historical workings of the U.S. NSI for defense (pre-2000)
29
See Peters, Heidi M, and Brendan W McGarry. “Defense Primer: Procurement.” Congressional Research Service, February 7, 2020, 3.
30

“When Congress appropriates money, it provides budget authority—the authority to enter into obligations. Obligations occur when agencies
enter into contracts, submit purchase orders, employ personnel, or otherwise legally commit to spending money.”: See Ibid; Schwartz, Moshe,
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will come to increasingly define the “fourth era of innovation:” namely, how specific
commercial products and technologies are co-opted and developed for military applications.
2. T HE

T HI R D O FF S E T S T RAT E G Y A ND T E C HN OL O GY AC Q UI S I T I ON

As previously noted, procurement is one of the three major channels identified by
Mowery (2009, 2010) from which public investments in defense-related technologies flow. DoD
procurement is a highly complex mechanism in which the armed services acquire the materials
and technologies from the private sector to serve its warfighting mission. The Department of
Defense defines the acquisition process in three stages: (1) technology development, (2) systems
development, and (3) production.33 This process has traditionally been run according to DoD
Directive 5000, the major procurement rules governing how the Pentagon acquires new weapons
and technologies.34 Procurement has been the subject of much attention at both the Pentagon and
among policymakers, considering notable technology acquisition failures that wasted billions in
appropriated funds (e.g. Future Combat Systems, RAH-66 Comanche).35
Acknowledging these contextual changes, the Department of Defense has taken steps to
build relationships with the commercial sector while lowering barriers to doing business. The
former has often revolved around the formation of new institutions (e.g. Defense Innovation
Unit, Defense Innovation Board), while the latter has focused on more efficient and rapid
contracting mechanisms (e.g. Other Transaction Authority, Commercial Solutions Opening). The
Pentagon’s articulated strategy to respond to the 21st century innovation context and bolster
American military superiority has been referred to as the Third Offset Strategy. Then-Secretary
of Defense Ashton Carter conveyed the motivation behind the Third Offset in remarks made at
the CSIS Conference in October 2016: “The current erosion of the U.S. technological advantage
derives not from adversaries’ numerical superiority or superior volumes of investment, but from
the increasing global and commercial nature of the innovation environment and the increasing
applicability of commercial technologies to military operations.”36 The Third Offset Strategy,
then, is focused on improving the ability of the Pentagon to harness the technological advances
in the commercial sector for military applications — to prepare the DoD to capture “spin-on”
innovations from the private sector.
One of the key pieces of this strategy has been the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), the
Department of Defense’s “scouting program” for spin-on technologies. Founded in 2015, the
DIU works to identify private sector technologies that can be co-opted for challenges facing the
33

See Schwartz, Moshe. “Defense Acquisitions: How DoD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process.”
Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2014, 21.
34
See Freedberg, Sydney J. “Choose Your Own Acquisition Adventure: Ellen Lord.” Breaking Defense. Breaking Media, December 5, 2019.
https://breakingdefense.com/2019/12/choose-your-own-acquisition-adventure-ellen-lord/.
35
See Demotes-Mainard, Julien. “RAH-66 Comanche-The Self-Inflicted Termination: Exploring the Dynamics of Change in Weapons
Procurement.” Defense Acquisition University, April 2012, 27.
36
Carter Gives Keynote Address at CSIS Conference. CSIS Conference, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DsfPaFNELYI.
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Defense Department. Defense Innovation Unit offices have been founded in Silicon Valley,
Austin, and Boston with the goal of tapping into the projects and relationships being cultivated
within the regional innovation hubs. The DIU connects the Pentagon and leading commercial
firms through its 3-step “National Security Challenge” pathway. The unit begins with a demandsignal from its DoD partners, who contact the DIU with a “mission-critical challenge” their
organization is facing.37 The DIU will discuss next steps, including appointing a dedicated
liaison and funding for prototype solutions. Then, the DIU and DoD partner translate their
relevant challenge into an open commercial solicitation (a Commercial Solutions Opening) to
receive innovative proposals, and together the DIU and its DoD liaison will award contracts for
one or more prototype projects, setting the stage for eventual technology adoption.
Moreover, DoD procurement policy has undergone significant change over the past
decade, as reforms behind institutional structure, contracting, etc. have begun to come into effect.
In 2009, the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act began the reform process for the
procurement of major weapons systems. The legislation created a Pentagon office, the Office of
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), to analyze the cost of new programs and put
more emphasis on weapons testing before production. Moreover, armed services commanders
were given more say in weapons requirements, a decision expanded upon in the 2016 National
Defense Authorization Act, which provided the heads of the armed services with increased
control (and greater liability) for weapons programs and their requirements. Of particular
importance is a major overhaul of DoD Directive 5000 from a “one-size-fits-all” acquisitions
approach to an adaptive acquisition framework with six different pathways: urgent operational
needs, middle tier acquisition, major capability acquisition, software acquisition, defense
business systems, and acquisition of services. The middle tier acquisition pathway is also of note,
allowing DoD program managers to prototype or field mature technologies in an operational
environment within five years, a much more rapid procurement process.38
The Pentagon has sought statutory authority for accelerated contracting and alternative
ways to engage with commercial partners, including the Other Transaction Authority (OTA) and
Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO) procedure.39 These mechanisms are intended for
companies and organizations that are conducting research on technology which could have
relevant defense applications, but do not have previous or extensive contracting history with the
federal government.40 However, OTAs are also open to traditional contractors and universities
which are proposing project work in the spirit of rapid prototyping. Other Transaction Authority
37

See Defense Innovation Unit. “DIU | Work with Us.” Accessed April 30, 2020. https://www.diu.mil/work-with-us.
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Satisfy DoD's Need for Procurement Speed.” Federal News Network, March 28, 2019. https://federalnewsnetwork.com/acquisitionpolicy/2019/03/otas-arent-the-only-answer-to-satisfy-dods-need-for-procurement-speed/
40
See DARPA. “Contract Management.” Accessed April 30, 2020. https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/contractmanagement#OtherTransaction; Defense Acquisition University. “Other Transaction (OT) Guide | Adaptive Acquisition Framework.” Accessed
April 30, 2020. https://aaf.dau.edu/aaf/ot-guide/.
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comes in two forms: Technology Investment Agreements (TIAs) and Other Transactions for
Prototypes (OTs for Prototypes). Technology Investment Agreements are not subject to
procurement regulations (e.g. Federal Acquisition Regulation), and are intended as assistance
instruments used to “reduce barriers to commercial firm’s participating in defense research, to
give the DoD access to the broadest possible technology and industrial base; promote new
relationships among performers in both the defense and commercial sectors of that technology
and industrial base; and stimulate performers to develop, use, and disseminate improved
performance and contracting practices.”41 The TIA also allows contractors to conduct their
accounting using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), rather than the FAR or
DFARS cost principles likely to be unfamiliar to a small commercial technology firm. Like
TIAs, Other Transactions for Prototypes are also not subject to FAR regulations and allow
contract awardees to avoid abiding by the relevant FAR cost accounting standards. The Pentagon
has the authority to award OTs for Prototypes for projects where the final deliverable will be a
prototype “directly relevant to enhancing the mission effectiveness of military personnel and the
supporting platforms, systems, components, or materials proposed to be acquired or developed
by the Department of Defense or the armed services.”42 While these OTs offer awardees
significant flexibility on negotiating contract terms and conditions, the one absolute requirement
for receiving an OT for Prototyping is the involvement of a small business or nontraditional
defense contractor.43
While the creation of new procurement pathways seems intuitive to facilitate prototyping
and technology adoption, are DoD stakeholders using them? DARPA has placed the Other
Transaction Authority (OTA) at the center of its latest AI campaign, the Artificial Intelligence
Exploration program. Announced in July 2018, the program envisions high-risk, high-payoff
projects demonstrating the feasibility of innovative AI concepts within 18 months of award, a
rapid acquisition pipeline reminiscent of commercial speeds. DARPA is employing both types of
OTAs: Technology Investment Agreements (TIAs) and Other Transactions for Prototypes (OTs
for Prototypes). Similarly, the Defense Innovation Unit utilizes both CSOs and OTAs in its
engagement with cutting-edge commercial technology companies. The unit begins with a
Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO) process, a competitive solicitation of proposals for
potential solutions to problems facing DoD partners, such as the Air Force, Navy, and JAIC. The
DIU will respond to CSOs within thirty days to schedule a pitch, and chosen firms will then
proceed to contracting using Other Transaction Authority, specifically OTs for Prototypes.44

41
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coverage.”
44
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The motivation behind granting OTA and CSO authority to acquisition units in the
Pentagon — to increase flexibility for prototyping and work with non-traditional contractors —
is to improve both traditional procurement and the ability of the DoD to more effectively capture
spin-on innovations. Similarly, the creation of the Defense Innovation Unit and other
procurement changes (e.g. DoD Directive 5000 reform, CAPE, and the 2016 NDAA) embody
the spirit of the Third Offset Strategy to make the DoD more nimble in acquiring cutting-edge
technologies being spearheaded by the commercial technology sector. Ultimately, the Third
Offset seeks to improve the institutional underpinnings of the national innovation system for
national security in order to realize the articulated promise of the Third Offset to secure
American military superiority
3.

M E T H O D OL O GY

My research uses a case study methodology. Using the case study method allows me to
examine the institutional and policy reforms undertaken under the auspices of the Third Offset
Strategy to determine their impact on the ability of the U.S. national innovation system to
identify and facilitate the development of novel technologies.
The analysis of case studies to answer research-driven questions has extensive precedent
in the social sciences, particularly in legal studies. As discussed by Miller (2018), case study
research involves the intensive analysis of one or several phenomena, outcomes, or processes; it
is aimed at gaining as complete an understanding of the object under study as possible.45 A case
study approach is most applicable to my research considering that I will be examining the
institutional and policy underpinnings of the U.S. national innovation system for national
security; these underpinnings are necessarily decided by the complex legal regime dictating the
Pentagon’s procurement and organizational policies, as decided by Congressional and DoD
policy makers. Moreover, because legal rules, forms, institutions, and norms are likely to have
critical temporal and spatial dimensions, it is difficult to make broad comparisons and
generalizations, necessitating a case study analysis. Indeed, because law functions through causal
pathways that sometimes overlap, it is challenging to determine discrete and identifiable cause
and effects (as you would be able to develop in other fields of research using something like
regression analysis, for example). Lastly, Miller (2018) discusses how case studies can be useful
in the event of new or low information contexts and skepticism about conventional wisdom,
relevant here to both the recency of the Third Offset Strategy reforms and general consensus in
Washington that the U.S. is not doing enough to maintain its innovation edge.
I have identified two case studies from which to analyze the national innovation system
for defense in the twenty-first century. Both identified case studies share three similar features

45
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which makes the insights largely generalizable and useful to study. First, each case study
revolves around a singular “technology” or innovation. Second, this innovation will have both
clear civilian implications (e.g. GPS for consumer navigation) and be relevant to the Pentagon’s
national security mission. Third, to be sure that the technology is born out of the twenty-first
century innovation context, case studies are temporally restricted to post-2000 and must be
largely born out of the civilian tech economy (a spin-on innovation, essentially).
The first case study is that of defense biometrics.46 The technology, which involves
utilizing physiological characteristics (like a fingerprint) for identification and access control,
came into use in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 9/11, it has become a key feature of the
United States’ counterinsurgency strategy. The case of defense biometrics highlights how a
technology untested in military operations became a military innovation with real operational
impacts (e.g. detainee management, high-value targeting). It also illuminates the challenges
associated with the development, acquisition, and successful use of a new technology on the
ground by warfighters. The case study of biometrics will provide key lessons for military
innovation in general, and then be analyzed from the perspective of its implications for the
reforms of the Third Offset Strategy.
The second case that will be examined in this Article is that of artificial intelligence.
Artificial intelligence is a technology that is becoming increasingly important to the U.S.
military’s great power strategy in an era of rivals fielding asymmetric strategies to deny the
freedom to access (and field forces) in their respective spheres of influence. For example, in July
2017, the Chinese government released a strategy detailing its plan to dominate AI by 2030, and
in September 2017, the Russian government similarly announced its intention to pursue AI
technological superiority.47 The ability of the armed services to successfully incorporate AI into
warfighting is considered by defense officials and policymakers to be indicative of the future of
the nation’s military superiority.
Alongside the similar case profiles — singular "technology" or innovation, civilian
applications with national security implications, and a post-2000 "spin-on" innovation — of
biometrics and artificial intelligence, the two sets of technologies also share an important quality:
They represent the military’s quest to increase the agility at which it operates. In this new “legs
race,” the innovative applications of biometrics and AI will not be used (necessarily) to augment
the destructive capabilities of the armed services as in a conventional “arms race”, but to achieve
the compression of time and space to field more nimble warfighters.48 I will then apply the
46
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insights gleaned from defense biometrics to that of artificial intelligence, examining how the
Third Offset Strategy and reforms to procurement rules either promote or undermine the
Pentagon’s goal to field this next-generation technology.

4.

CASE I:

D E FE NS E

B I O M E T RI CS

Automated biometrics was a developing consumer technology in the 1990s, with existing
applications for access control and identity verification. With the advent of the Global War on
Terror after 9/11, identity dominance as a guiding strategy for the federal government and the
armed services led to its adoption as a defense technology in the 2000s to 2010s. Part IV defines
biometrics, sketches the military application, and charts the timeline in which biometrics became
an important tool used by warfighters. This Part then concludes with insights drawn for military
innovation and implications for the Third Offset Strategy.
4.1

Defining biometrics

As defined by the International Standards Committee on Biometrics, biometrics is the
“automated recognition of individuals based on their behavioral and biological characteristics.”49
The U.S. National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Subcommittee on Biometrics
provides a similar, but slightly more general definition: “A measurable biological (anatomical
and physiological) and/or behavioral characteristic that can be used for automated recognition.”50
These behavioral and biological characteristics unique to an individual — also known as
biometric characteristics — are the distinguishing, repeatable biometric features which can be
extracted for biometric recognition.51 Examples of biometric characteristics include face
topography, facial skin texture, finger topography, iris structure, vein structure of the hand, ridge
structure of the palm, retinal pattern, and handwritten signature dynamics.52 In order to be
recognized, an individual must be known or “learned” through an enrollment process, in which
their biometric characteristics are recorded by the biometric system.53 This previously enrolled
biometric data can be compared to existing contextual data to a particular individual or for the
verification of identity, a process known as biometric matching.

49
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Biometrics — as defined by the use of behavioral and biological characteristics to
identify individuals — has existed for centuries. The established custom of handwritten
signatures for legal agreements, commercial exchange, and banking is but one example.54 The
conventional definition of biometrics, and the modern innovation, is that of automated
biometrics; over the past forty years, a proliferation of biometric technologies have allowed users
to automate the once-laborious process of verification. Biometrics have thus expanded into a
variety of enterprise applications, with one of the most important being access control. Access
control systems recognize individuals whose biometric characteristics are logged into the
system.55 When these users interact with an access control interface, they are granted access to
the secured space. Biometrics for access control applications saw initial widespread adoption by
both universities for their research laboratories and the nuclear power industry.56 For example,
San Jose State University (SJSU) has been using hand geometry readers since 1993 for
controlled, secure access to its Computer and Telecommunications Center.57 Additionally, by
2003, the entrances to more than half of U.S. nuclear power plants were equipped with biometric
hand geometry systems to ensure the safety of internal power generation facilities from potential
sabotage or terrorist activity.58
Beyond access control, biometrics can supplement existing identity verification measures
and achieve secondary firm objectives. The Walt Disney Company has utilized biometric
technology — finger geometry — to secure its theme park tickets since June 2005.59 Upon entry
to Disney’s parks, the guest presents one fingerprint to be scanned. This fingerprint information
is then recorded and matched to their park ticket, allowing Disney to ensure that all tickets can
only be used by the individual who first presented it to gain entry. In this way, the Walt Disney
Company essentially eliminates the potential ticket reseller market, as a guest cannot “hand off”
their ten-day park ticket after two days of use because their biometrics remain tied to it.60 The
firm has received some criticism by privacy advocates (e.g. The Electronic Privacy Information
Center, ACLU) for introducing biometric technology to “access roller coasters,” with Disney
contesting that its system does not store fingerprint images and guests can only present valid
photo identification instead.61
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4.2

The military application: Identity dominance

As previously noted, a collection of biometric characteristics can be compiled on any one
individual. Taken together, their biometric data can be combined with biographical and
contextual information to create a “pattern of life” profile for individual subjects.62 Using this
profile in conjunction with other biometric data and all-source intelligence, analysts can identify
connections among other individuals, correlate their activities, and discern the structure of their
social networks. The doctrine of identity dominance stems from this ability to “crack open”
human networks through the fusion of biometric data and intelligence gathering: terrorist
networks during the United States’ War on Terror (2001 - ongoing).63
Identity dominance theory was first promulgated in the context of the Global War on
Terrorism, the original impetus for the military adoption of biometric technology. In this context,
identity dominance translates to the ability of U.S. authorities — from the military to the
Department of Homeland Security — to link an enemy combatant or similar national security
threat to their previously used identities and past activities (as they relate to terrorism and other
crimes).64 The logic proceeds as follows: The U.S. military must be able to determine whether a
person encountered by a warfighter in the field is a friend or foe. The ability of the United States
to make a successful determination has direct implications for the success of its mission and the
safety of its personnel and allies. Warfighters cannot rely on the individual’s given name and
“official documents;” these materials can be forged while aliases and cover stories can be
concocted at whim. If the military cannot verify an individual’s identity with their name and
documents, biometric matching is the solution to this identity conundrum. Biometric data cannot
be falsified, as one cannot simply falsify their finger topography or hand vein structure with any
relative ease. In this way, an individual’s physiological and behavioral traits provide an indelible
link to their identity or presence at a given event. Identity dominance depends on coordinating
biometric systems across U.S. authorities: Homeland Security, State Department, FBI, state and
local law enforcement, and the intelligence community.65 In other words, an FBI agent
investigating a person of interest in a domestic terror cell could find evidence that the same
individual had been detained by Coalition forces in Iraq or Afghanistan some years prior through
the registration and verification of their biometrics. On the flip side, a warfighter conducting
regular biometric checks at a border crossing could identify and detain an individual who had
been previously arrested in the United States (by uploading their data into the FBI’s IAFIS
database).66
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4.3

A spin-on innovation: Bringing defense biometrics to warfighting

Initial biometrics development largely developed out of university lab research with
subsequent translation to the commercial sector. The 1970s saw the adoption of hand geometry
biometrics for a number of access control applications. For example, 1974 marked the first
deployment of early biometrics technology at the University of Georgia, where hand geometry
readers were used for access to its dormitory food service areas.67 By 1985, one of the first
retinal scanning systems was installed for access control purposes at the Naval Postgraduate
School. Iris recognition technologies were developed in the 1980s by researchers at the
University of Cambridge led by Dr. John Daugman. In the 1990s, research expanded upon the
traditional biometric modalities (e.g. fingerprint, hand geometry, iris, and retina) to include the
development of voice, signature, palm print, and (early) facial recognition.68 For example,
DARPA sponsored the FacE REcognition Technology (FERET) program from 1993 to 1997 in
conjunction with the DoD Counterdrug Technology Development Program Office. The initiative
was intended to encourage the development of facial recognition programs, and it both assessed
existing prototypes and encouraged its development for commercialization as a non-defense
product.69 1995 also saw the launch of the first commercial iris product due to a joint project
between the Defense Nuclear Agency and Iriscan to create a prototype device.70 In this way, the
Department of Defense was attuned to early developments in automated biometrics, and it played
an initial supporting role in supporting technological development and proof-of-concept through
the first facial and iris recognition prototypes. This reflects the traditional role of the DoD in
sponsoring R&D of potential defense-relevant technologies — the “first channel” of investments
in basic and applied research.
Prior to 2001, biometrics was a largely new technology untested for defense purposes,
with limited operational application on the battlefield itself. Prior to Iraq and Afghanistan, the
Pentagon’s use case for biometrics was restricted to physical access control and securing
automated systems, similar to existing commercial applications at the time. The Army began a
biometric development program in 1999 at the behest of Congress, which granted $10 million to
conduct "[an] immediate assessment of biometrics sensors and templates ... to accomplish a more
focused and effective information assurance effort."71 At the same time, Army Chief Information
Officer Lieutenant General William H. Campbell commissioned the RAND Corporation to
67
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review existing commercial biometric applications and assess the sociological, legal, and ethical
issues raised by military use of biometrics. The RAND study also considered the establishment
of a biometrics center.72 In July 2000, Public Law 106-246 designated the Secretary of the Army
as “… the Executive Agent to lead, consolidate and coordinate all biometrics information
assurance programs of the Department of Defense.”73
The conflicts in Iraq (2001 - 2011) and Afghanistan (2001 - 2020) introduced biometrics
to U.S. warfighting capabilities.74 Military officials were confronted with the inadequacy of
prevailing intelligence technologies in waging counterinsurgency operations in dense, sprawling
urban environments populated by both militants and innocent civilians. As coalition forces
turned to a counter-insurgency strategy after early conventional successes in both theatres, they
needed to be able to attain population-level information and specific intelligence for identifying
and eliminating insurgents on the field.75 For American soldiers on the battlefield, the identity
crisis was clear: How could you distinguish between an enemy “soldier” and a member of the
local population? As previously noted, “identity dominance” emerged as a theory linking this
struggle to the wartime needs of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Biometrics offered a
promising solution to this identity crisis by identifying actors based not on their stated identity or
documentation, but on concrete, unfalsifiable biometric characteristics. In conjunction with
contextual data, warfighters could also use biometrics to root out terrorist cells and their
networks.76 It was in this context that the Pentagon came to recognize biometric identification
“as a basic warfighting capability.”77 With the defense use case for biometrics in the War on
Terror made clear, how would the military go about developing, procuring, and implementing
the technology in its warfighting on the ground?
In August 2001, the Pentagon stood-up the Biometrics Fusion Center (BFC), a unit
tasked with evaluating and integrating existing commercial biometric identification systems for
military and federal agencies. While the U.S. Army held executive authority over the BFC, the
unit itself was cross-functional, with officers from the other services and revolving experts from
academia and the private sector to the Center to ensure effective coordination across the military.
The Biometrics Fusion Center would work with interested parties in the DoD on implementing
“quick-look” programs; these projects would be short-term technology and qualification
programs designed to “see how biometrics work outside the lab in a small operational
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environment.”78 Indeed, as Phillip Loranger, director of the Biometrics Fusion Center at the time
commented, the Center’s evaluation process was necessary because of the “inherent differences
between commercial and government application [as] plug-and-play is the exception.”79 With the
available commercial technology requiring adaptation for military specifications, the military’s
adoption of biometrics can be understood as a spin-on innovation, the “fourth channel.”
Essentially, the BFC was the “hub” for the Pentagon’s initial pursuit of biometrics: It provided
an institutional basis for the efforts of the armed services to explore the use case of existing
commercial biometric technology for their own operational objectives and facilitated the
“movement” of both the products and best practices across the services.
The first Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) was produced by the Battle Command
Battle Laboratory by the end of 2001. BAT is a multimodal (fingerprint, iris, and face) system
for the collection, matching, and storage of personally identifiable biometric information. Its
technical interface is a laptop with plug-in devices for facial, fingerprint and retina capture.80 Iris
recognition relied on a handheld device developed by SecuriMetrics Inc., a startup launched in
1999 in Martinez, California by CEO and Founder Greg Peterson.81 Neurotechnology —
founded as “Neurotechnologija” in 1990 in Vilnius, Lithuania — provided a fingerprint capture
and identification engine for BAT’s fingerprint recognition capabilities82. A facial recognition
engine was developed by Lau Technologies83, which allowed warfighters to take a photo and
convert it to a 3D image. The firm was founded in 1990 by Joanna Lau in Littleton,
Massachusetts.84 The device was initially tested in Kosovo, where it was used to identify local
workers accessing U.S. installations in the region.85 As development proceeded from prototype
to functioning system in the Balkans, the incorporation of biometrics into U.S. military
operations in the Middle East became possible.
BAT was first employed by Joint Special Operations Command in Afghanistan in 2002
for the purpose of enrolling persons of interest detained in the battlefield. A year later, the device
had made its way to American forces in Iraq, moving beyond enrollment to interrogation
reporting and detainee management at Abu Ghraib.86 In this way, detainee management became
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one of the most important applications of biometric technology in the Middle East, improving
the previously-dysfunctional handling of detainees, documenting their capture, and identifying
and accounting for them all.87 The Second Battle of Fallujah in 2004 in Fallujah, Anbar Province
saw the first, large-scale deployment of biometrics. The city was encircled by Coalition forces,
and it was the scene of some of the fiercest urban combat in the entire war. All residents were
enrolled into the BAT system to facilitate identification.88 At the end of 2004, the successful
suicide bombing attack of a US base in Mosul led to efforts to deploy biometrics for access
control in US military facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. BISA, the Biometric Identifications
System for Access, is the repository for all biometric and biographical information collected
from foreign nationals seeking access to a secured U.S. facility.89 Enrolled individuals are
checked against both the Pentagon’s Automated Biometric System (ABIS) and the FBI’s
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). Those who pass the security
checks are granted a biometric ID card.90 In 2007, the Army’s biometric capabilities were
expanded with the operational use of the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment
(HIIDE).91 The handheld device, resembling a large camera, is a tactical extension of BAT,
allowing for the collection of iris, fingerprint, and biographical data in the field. The device also
communicates with BAT; the latter can export watchlists for on-the-spot identification to HIIDE
and can import digital “portfolios” of data on subjects to be uploaded into ABIS.92
The biometrics value proposition was validated in April 2011, when 475 prisoners in
Kandahar, Afghanistan escaped from the Sarposa prison. Coalition forces were able to apprehend
35 escapees in a matter of days through biometric identification at checkpoints, routine traffic
stops, and border crossings.93 Coalition forces have also worked closely with the Afghani justice
system to train security forces and prosecutors on using biometrics as evidence to secure criminal
convictions in domestic courts, a tactic which is believed to lead increased conviction records
and longer sentences compared to alternative forms of evidence.94 This has been an
advantageous work-around for U.S. forces in the country, limited in their legal ability to detain
“unprivileged enemy belligerents” and monitor released individuals for recidivism. Indeed, the
Afghan government now employs a biometric database of its own — the Afghan Automated
Biometric Identification System (AABIS) — in support of its prosecutorial initiatives for
counterterrorism, an example of defense biometrics strengthening local rule of law in
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Afghanistan.95 Lastly, biometrics have been successful in the Army’s identity-based targeting of
high value combatants. Biometric Identification Analysis Reports (BIAR) provided U.S. forces
with biographical information, encounter history, and instructions for identifying, tracking, and
targeting persons of interest, such as combatants linked to the construction and use of Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs) against Coalition forces.96 From 2007 to 2008 alone, approximately
1,700 insurgents were biometrically linked to existing forensic evidence associated with the
manufacture of IEDs.97
4.4

Lessons for military innovation

Looking back at the military’s two decades of experience with biometrics, it is clear that
the technology has reached “operational maturity.” Biometrics have become “programs of
record” — established procurement programs with their own management offices — for the
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. In 2015, for example, the Navy and Marine Corps kicked off an
open contract opportunity for vendors to develop “Identity Dominance System 2.0.” The
announcement called for expanding existing capabilities to include palm print, vascular, DNA,
voice, gait, and hand geometry data collection. The proposal’s “wish list” also included the
ability to collect information at a greater distance, greater storage capacity, and more rapid
processing.98 By understanding the process in which biometrics were successfully procured,
developed, and incorporated into the Army’s warfighting, it is possible to arrive at high-level
lessons relevant for the acquisition of future military innovations and assess what impact (if any)
recent reforms undertaken through the Third Offset Strategy could have had for defense
biometrics.
To begin, the story of defense biometrics demonstrates the importance of a clear use case
for a new technology in warfighting. An evolving military context in 2001 — the Middle Eastern
conflicts against complex foreign insurgencies — presented an ideal application for biometrics, a
technology as-yet unknown to the Army. In the early stages of the Global War on Terror, both
the growing need to identify and detain insurgents on the battlefield and the insufficiency of
existing technological solutions became apparent; falsified documentation could make verifying
an individual’s identity exceedingly difficult. At the same time, the realm of U.S. government
agencies combating foreign terrorism brought to the strategy of “identity dominance” to the fore.
Biometrics presented an innovative solution to both identification deficiencies on the ground and
an ability to realize identity dominance in the Global War on Terrorism, a powerful dual-use case
which drove the military’s early interest and commitment to biometrics as a tool for access
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control, detainee management, high-value targeting, and support for Rule of Law operations. A
clear use case for a military innovation may seem to be readily apparent, but it is worth
emphasizing this feature; the histories of both civilian and military technology development are
littered with examples of technologies pitched as “innovative” and “groundbreaking” that
ultimately went nowhere.99 Their promise remains unrealized in many cases because they failed
to solve a pressing problem facing end-users, and without the support of the ultimate
constituencies, languished and failed to leave an impact. Defense biometrics, then, illuminates
how a compelling use case facilitates early development, procurement, and on-the-ground
implementation by aligning the interests of stakeholders.
With the articulation of a clear compelling use case, the DoD must turn to the next step in
the innovation journey: obtaining the cutting-edge technological solution. The technology must
either be developed internally, or rely on procurement of existing commercial technology, or
some combination of these mechanisms. For a spin-on military innovation, the technology itself
must be mature enough for defense users to imagine potential applications and to realize these
applications in the field. Biometrics is an example of a technology that saw early internal
development (e.g. Battle Command Battle Laboratory), especially for BAT, but predominantly
relied on technology acquisition and adaptation from third-party commercial vendors to develop
its biometric modalities. Taken together, defense biometrics highlights how the Pentagon was in
a favorable position to benefit from the advancements (and investment) occurring in R&D and
prototyping for the identification technologies. Of course, one of the consequences of co-opting
an existing commercial technology for defense purposes is sacrificing a market-driving position
(i.e. private end-users govern the innovation’s development and standards). But still, as defense
biometrics demonstrates, the Pentagon is positioned to exploit developments in the commercial
sector and adapt to emerging military needs, saving institutional focus and valuable human and
financial capital at the same time.100
Having elaborated on the significance of a clear use case and the availability of existing
commercial technology for a spin-on innovation, both must be validated through prototyping. In
other words, a working prototype of a defense innovation must be put out into the hands of
warfighters in the field to determine if the technology in question realizes articulated needs. In
the case of defense biometrics, the technology benefited from the context of the Iraq and
Afghanistan Wars. Defense biometrics was a wartime innovation, as opposed to a technological
change occurring during peacetime. Some literature — such as Rosen (1991) — consider
wartime innovation to be a distinct causal pathway of change from peacetime innovation, as the
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former benefits from “the natural experiment” of the battlefield.101 The demands of war and
imperatives for success in the field lower barriers to change while the battlefield provides an
opportunity to conduct a natural experiment in which “technology requirements are explicitly
articulated in response to challenges posed by an actual adversary rather than a hypothetical
one.”102 Usage by warfighters allows technology program leaders to acquire rapid tactical
feedback, paving the way for iterative design and improvement in the technology’s defense
application. At the same time, operational needs become better defined, accelerating R&D,
prototyping, and deployment.
The metaphor of the battlefield as a natural experiment clearly reflects that of biometrics,
as the technology was put into the field in the form of BAT and then iterated and refined through
the challenges of implementation in the Middle East. Phil Scarfo, VP of worldwide sales and
marketing for biometrics solutions provider Lumidigm, defines the difference warfighters face in
applying their technology as compared to commercial providers: “In many cases, you have one
opportunity to collect the information. You can’t tolerate that information being lost or of
insufficient quality because [of] environmental conditions that aren’t ideal… Military users don’t
want to have to retake or mess around with stuff that may or may not work.”103 Private
technology firms like Lumidigm contracting with the Pentagon were able to optimize their
solutions to the needs of soldiers on the field through the iterative feedback received from initial
prototypes and design more effective technologies in response. For example, Scarfo discusses
how his firm recognized the challenge of spoofing: “In military use cases, you’re dealing with an
uncooperative user who may go to extreme measures to fool the biometric capture system,”
including contaminants on fingers, sandpaper removal of surface skin, and even surgical
alterations of fingerprints.104 Lumidigm won a Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR)
contract in 2006 from the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory Information Directorate in Rome,
NY to respond to this challenge.105 The SBIR contract was granted to Lumidigm to develop
fingerprint sensors that would resist efforts by uncooperative users to fool conventional readers,
an example of an iterative solution to an obstacle faced by warfighters in applying existing
biometric technology to their identification challenges in the field.
As noted, the Pentagon did not adopt biometrics in an institutional vacuum. The strategic
shift toward counterterrorism in the wake of 9/11 encouraged parallel biometric initiatives across
the federal government. In September 2001, the federal government had two operating biometric
systems: one at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the other at U.S. Immigration and
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Naturalization Service (INS).106 At the same time, the State Department, intelligence agencies,
and the Army had smaller research projects and pilot studies under way; these projects would
become tied to the mandates of their respective agencies in waging the War on Terror.107 Of the
operational biometric systems in 2001, the FBI’s was the most robust. The agency had collected,
preserved, classified, and exchanged fingerprint records with other Federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies since 1924. In 1999, the Agency made the pioneering decision to automate
this process, launching the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) in
1999.108 IAFIS introduced large-scale biometrics to the federal government, an example of a
successful biometrics system for identity verification for law enforcement purposes. In this way,
the Pentagon benefitted from the institutional ecosystem: Parallel biometric initiatives
established favorable cross-links, opportunities for knowledge-sharing, and also proof-of-concept
for what biometrics could look like: A military IAFIS, enrolled with the biometrics of detained
insurgents and civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps most of all, a critical mass of interest
groups — all pushing for new investments — made the pitch for (and development of)
biometrics by the Army all the easier.109
Of course, there are also some challenges to such parallel developments of an innovation
like biometrics, namely the ability to coordinate communication, interoperability, and matching
standards among diverse systems with distinct “data owners.” Identity dominance was premised
on overcoming institutional differences in these three criteria so threat identity information could
be shared across the law enforcement apparatus.110 According to a 2011 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) study, the initial effectiveness of biometrics in the War on Terror
was hampered by early disagreements between the DoD, FBI, and Department of Homeland
Security in establishing interagency biometric sharing agreements and direct connectivity
between their respective databases.111 The institutional context of the Pentagon’s biometrics
development highlights both the benefits of agency cross-linkages for an innovation’s
development and the importance of technology implementation in order to realize its true
potential.112
While the discussion has so far been oriented around procurement and development,
defense biometrics highlights how other concerns — namely ethics — can come into play in
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deploying a military innovation. In deciding to introduce a new technology to warfighting, both
the Pentagon and commercial firms must respond to the ethical implications of this decision. The
armed services could be seeking to procure a technology which has largely settled ethical
questions in the consumer market or remains controversial still in that setting (e.g. mass data
collection).113 For spin-on innovations more so, the ethical questions of a technology can be
particularly distinct from its commercial application. If these questions are not adequately
addressed, technology adoption can be stymied by stakeholders in the process, such as
employees at various commercial firms themselves protesting work that could assist the U.S.
military. Defense biometrics highlights this challenge: As discussed, biometrics in the consumer
marketplace traditionally revolved around a cooperative end-user. For example, in access control
as a sensitive university research facility, faculty and staff give their explicit consent to enroll
their biometric characteristics in the system. There is little question over the ethics of voluntary
enrollment in such a system, besides perhaps the importance of safeguarding this personally
identifiable data.
In the military domain, however, we must remember that most individuals being enrolled
in the DoD’s ABIS are involuntary users. Whether they are detainees on the battlefield or even
Afghani or Iraqi civilians, their autonomy is limited in regard to granting consent to be enrolled
in an American-owned and operated biometric database. In other words, what are the ethics of
U.S. military forces possessing the biometric data of thousands of foreign nationals, many of
them simply innocent men, women, and children? The Pentagon was prescient in this manner,
and the 2001 RAND study “Army Biometric Applications'' prepared defense officials for the
sociological, legal, and ethical issues associated with biometrics and measures the Army might
take to mitigate these concerns.114 Even with guidance and early steps taken in regard to
individual privacy rights, governance, and standards for the collection of this personally
identifiable information, the Pentagon has received criticism from some privacy and human
rights groups over what they consider the military’s overreach in its mass collection of biometric
data on Afghani and Iraqi civilians, as well as the potential spill-over effects from this (e.g.
selective targeting, privacy violations).115 Despite pointed criticism from some parties, the armed
services have not experienced concerted vocal opposition from key stakeholders — The House
and Senate Armed Services Committees, the White House, GAO, etc. — that would have the
ability to undermine or delay the implementation of the technology.116 It is likely that the
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Pentagon’s proactive approach in tackling the ethical implications of biometrics pre-empted
potential protestations and allowed for a smoother roll-out of the technology to warfighters.
4.5

Implications for the Third Offset Strategy

The most important lesson learned for military innovation from defense biometrics was
for the prototyping of new technologies: If possible, prototypes should be placed in the hands of
warfighters in the field as a “natural experiment.” The Third Offset Strategy, in seeking to
incentivize innovation in both industry and government, has made procurement reform a
keystone of its approach to improving the military’s ability to adopt and develop cutting-edge
technologies for national security needs.117 Procurement reforms such as Other Transaction
Authority and Commercial Solutions Opening have been implemented to accelerate the
contracting process and create alternative ways to engage with commercial partners. Similarly,
the overhaul of DoD Directive 5000 under Defense Undersecretary Ellen Lord to create different
acquisition pathways versus a “one-size-fits-all” acquisitions policy is a step in the right
direction toward enabling and making the process of prototype contracting simpler for private
firms whose technologies are of interest to Army officials. For example, Directive 5000’s new
“middle tier acquisition policy” would allow DoD program managers to prototype or field
mature technologies in an operational environment within five years, a rapid procurement
pathway reflective of the agility in which the Army was able to develop its biometric
capabilities: from research in its Battle Command Battle Laboratory in 1999 to a working BAT
prototype fielded in the Balkans by 2001.118
One cautionary note from relying on the case of defense biometrics for future military
innovations concerns the ability of warfighters to prototype in the “natural experiment” setting of
the battlefield. Biometrics was uniquely suited for the use case of insurgency tactics and
counterterrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan and saw quick operational deployment during those
conflicts, but the Pentagon does not envision the Middle East to be the theatre of armed conflict
in the years to come. As noted, in a new era of great power conflict, the armed services are
seeking to respond to the asymmetric military capabilities of its rival competitor states. In this
environment, the feasibility of a “natural experiment” environment — in other words, the
battlefield — is likely to be limited at the present de facto absence of military hostilities between
the United States and great power adversaries. This does not obviate the ability of the Pentagon
and its partners to begin the process of procuring, prototyping, and experimenting with new
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technologies, but it limits the opportunity to outline technology requirements in response to the
challenges posed by an actual opponent, rather than a hypothetical one and to receive tactical
feedback from warfighters engaging in the stated operational use case (e.g. Coalition soldiers
utilizing BAT to collect the iris, fingerprint, and facial biometric data of detained Iraqi
insurgents).
Additionally, biometrics illuminates the importance of deep relationships between the
Pentagon and private commercial firms eager to work with defense customers in designing
products uniquely suited to their needs. The Army worked successfully with what were then
largely small biometric technology startups untested in the defense arena.119 Some firms, like
Lau Technologies which provided a facial recognition engine to the DoD, did have prior defense
contracting experience, but on the whole, most of the vendors had seen their first products
designed for commercial vendors.120 In this way, the Third Offset Strategy has emphasized
outreach to non-traditional (non-defense) firms, smaller enterprises, and tapping into the
innovation hubs of Silicon Valley, Boston, and Austin. The Defense Innovation Unit perhaps
embodies this desire to extend the Pentagon’s relationships with cutting-edge technology firms
with its exclusive focus on fielding and scaling commercial technology across the U.S. military
at commercial speeds.121 Indeed, alternative modes of contracting (Other Transaction
Authority/Commercial Solutions Opening) are also beneficial beyond increasing the speed of
prototyping but also enabling the Pentagon to work with (and get money in the hands of) small
enterprises who may be looking to secure early backing, capital, and proof-of-concept for future
R&D and success in the commercial market, a sequence of events which is mutually beneficial
for the DoD and the innovative firms it seeks to work with. Lastly, while the Third Offset
Strategy has not explicitly touched upon the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grant
program, its use by the Air Force for Lumidigm to develop spoofing-proof sensor technology
offers an example of how the program remains highly relevant to allow small, high-tech U.S.
businesses and academia the opportunity to provide innovative research and development
solutions in response to critical DoD needs.122
Lastly, the case of defense biometrics highlights what has been outside the scope of the
Third Offset Strategy and procurement reform: non-institutional characteristics of defense
innovation. As discussed for defense biometrics, these include both the ethical challenges of
fielding a new military technology and the imperative of developing the needed human capital to
operate innovations effectively on the battlefield. Indeed, the challenge of also articulating a
clear doctrine for an innovation exists, as biometrics had to be framed in terms of the evolving
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way in which the Army was waging war in the Middle East at the time. New innovations, if they
promise to disrupt the traditional way of waging conflict, will have to be coherent with either
existing Army methods or align with the Pentagon’s future strategies for the warfare of the
future.
5.

CASE

II:

A RT I FI C I A L I NT E L L I GE NC E

Artificial intelligence is expected to define the future technological superiority of the U.S.
military and how the armed services conduct warfare in the twenty-first century. AI technologies
have experienced significant growth and development among both leading commercial
technology firms (e.g. Google, Amazon, Microsoft) and leading-edge startups. These innovations
are necessarily dual-use, and the Pentagon has devoted much of its acquisition processes and
reforms to promote the adoption of AI algorithms. Part V defines artificial intelligence, explores
the potential military applications of AI, and charts out the steps taken thus far to acquire and
promote AI capabilities in the DoD. This Part then concludes with a discussion of Project Maven
as its “first AI experiment,” and implications for future AI procurement.
5.1

Defining artificial intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) is exceedingly difficult to define. Unlike automated
biometrics, there exists no agreed-upon definition issued by a standards body like the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO).123 The academic literature on the subject of
AI is equally inchoate, with most studies acknowledging that no commonly accepted definition
yet exists.124 Stanford University’s One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence argues
that Nilsson (2009) provides one of the more useful definitions of AI: “Artificial intelligence is
that activity devoted to making machines intelligent, and intelligence is that quality that enables
an entity to function appropriately and with foresight in its environment.”125 On the other hand,
the Brookings Institution in its A Blueprint for the Future of AI (2018-2019) lays out a threetiered definition for artificial intelligence: intentionality, intelligence, and adaptability.126
Intentionality refers to the design of AI algorithms by human engineers to make decisions, often
using real-time data. Artificial intelligence is “intelligent” in the sense that its data inputs enable
decision-making informed by something, often either machine learning or data analytics. The
third quality, adaptability, underlies the unique ability of AI programs to learn and adapt as
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information is compiled and decisions are made. The definitions of Nilsson (2009) and
Brookings share an emphasis on the unique value proposition of AI programs to “make machines
intelligent” through data inputs that allow it to adapt (and improve) its performance over time in
a changing environment. Taken together, these definitions also convey that while AI may be a
singular “set” of innovations, it is not exactly a unitary “technology” in the sense of a new
nuclear missile or satellite. In this way, artificial intelligence is akin to defense biometrics,
considering both are ways of classifying the common techniques and methods behind the wide
range of innovative applications they promise (e.g. iris recognition and hand geometry are both
technologies understood to be “defense biometrics”).
For the purposes of this Article, I will rely on the Department of Defense’s working
definition of artificial intelligence. The White House, despite the articulation of several executive
orders and initiatives around AI, has also side-stepped issuing a singular definition to unify the
federal understanding of the technology.127 The origins of the Pentagon’s definition for AI is best
captured in FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).128 According to the FY2019
NDAA, AI can be understood as any of the following:
1. Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without
significant human oversight, or that can learn from experience and improve performance when
exposed to data sets.
2. An artificial system developed in computer software, physical hardware, or other context that
solves tasks requiring human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, communication, or
physical action.
3. An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, including cognitive architectures and
neural networks
4. A set of techniques, including machine learning that is designed to approximate a cognitive task
5. An artificial system designed to act rationally, including an intelligent software agent or
embodied robot that achieves goals using perception, planning, reasoning, learning,
communicating, decision-making, and acting.

.
The National Defense Authorization Act does not stake out a singular definition for AI,
instead offering several potential understandings of the concept. However, the Pentagon’s
official Artificial Intelligence Strategy, released on February 12, 2019, provides a more succinct
definition of AI that will guide all relevant initiatives across the armed services. For the purposes
of my analysis, I will rely on this simplified definition of AI adopted by the military: The ability
of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence — for example,
recognizing patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or
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taking action — whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical
systems.129
Artificial intelligence is not “new,” per se, if traced to the early musings on “thinking
machines.” Alan Turing is often credited with the origin of artificial intelligence as a concept for
a family of complex machines that could reason at the level of a human being.130 The “Turing
Test” evaluates the ability of computers to complete reasoning puzzles as well as humans such
that they may be considered “thinking” in an autonomous manner.131 “Artificial intelligence” as
a term was first promulgated by researcher John McCarthy to denote machines capable of
thinking autonomously.132 With this early corpus of research, the contemporary resurgence of
interest in AI — and its innovative (and disruptive133) applications across industries — arose in
the 2010s due to the convergence of three developments: the rise of “big data” sources,
improvements to machine learning134, and increases in computer processing capabilities.135
Existing artificial technology is that of “artificial narrow intelligence” (ANI), also known as
“Weak” AI. Narrow AI refers to algorithms designed to perform a single task, whether it be
image recognition, game playing, or even checking the weather.136 ANI systems operate within a
predetermined, pre-defined range, and they are not conscious or sentient in the form of human
thinking. They attend to a given task in real-time (e.g. writing news reports), pulling information
from a specific data set.137
The commercial applications of AI are varied, with innovative applications in industries
as diverse as education, healthcare, and consumer technology. In the midst of the covid-19
pandemic, artificial intelligence is being deployed by both private firms and researchers in the
healthcare industry in the quest to identify potential therapies for the virus. In February 2020,
researchers from the AI drug discovery company BenevolentAI and Imperial College London
published a paper in the medical journal Lancet describing a potential drug, baricitinib, which
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could be efficacious against covid-19.138 In order to identify baricitinib, the authors utilized
BenevolentAI’s proprietary algorithms, which were connected to molecular structure data on
covid-19 to biomedical information about relevant receptors and diseases to determine potential
drug targets. While further testing will be necessary to determine baricitinib’s therapeutic
efficacy, Benevolent AI-ICL’s joint AI effort demonstrates one of the primary motivations for
artificial intelligence solutions: increasing agility while conserving time and resources.139 An
interesting consumer technology application of AI is Duolingo, a Pittsburgh-based startup
offering a language-learning website and mobile app. Duolingo provides its foreign language
training using Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) and Natural Language Processing (NLP)
techniques to recognize language errors and help users correct them, all based on AI algorithmic
technology.140 Their AI capabilities rely on deep learning, a subset of AI and machine learning
which uses neural networks to model the brain’s behavior to analyze data and draw intelligent
predictions.141 Using these deep learning algorithms, Duolingo can analyze log data from its
300+ million active users, and then predict the likelihood that given users will get the answer
correct, providing personalization for the language app’s learning tests and content.142
These commercial applications demonstrate the versatility of existing “narrow” AI
technologies, whether it be for drawing predictive models or natural language processing. More
generally, artificial intelligence promises to increase the speed at which tasks are accomplished
by supplanting previous human cognition — and the valuable time and effort it requires — with
autonomous analysis. Moreover, artificial intelligence is considered to be a “relatively
transparent enabling capability;” in other words, one may be utilizing a particular product or
software and not even be aware of the AI algorithms working underneath the hood.143 Indeed,
Duolingo’s users are not privy to the company’s proprietary predictive technologies helping to
personalize the language learning experience. While they may be running “in the background,”
the extraordinary value they present to the firm and its customers alike is not. Professor Michael
Horowitz, associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, compares AI
to an internal combustion engine or electricity, an enabling technology with a multitude of
applications differing from, and broader than, any missile, submarine, or tank.144 In this way, AI
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procurement is unlikely to result in countable objects, but algorithms will be purchased and
incorporated into larger existing or newly fabricated systems: “We will not buy AI. It will be
used to solve problems, and there will be an expectation that AI will be infused in most things
we do.”145
5.2

Ongoing and proposed military applications: Speed and lethality

At the most basic level, the overarching application of AI for the military is quite simple:
to increase its speed and agility.146 Lieutenant General Jack Shanahan, Director of DoD Joint
Artificial Intelligence Center, has placed this objective at the center of the Pentagon’s AI
strategy: “[We] envision an American military that uses AI to move much faster.”147 Defense
officials believe that the speed of warfare is rapidly increasing, considering the proliferation of
hypersonic weapons and the growing use of cyber-attacks by American competitor states.148 Of
course, speed in-and-of itself can be a certain advantage on and off the battlefield, whether it be
to catch an adversary unawares or to use speed as defense.149 This is the promise of winning “the
legs race:” to achieve the compression of time and space to field more nimble warfighters.150 Of
course, the Pentagon is not only seeking to increase the speed of its weapons, but also to improve
military decision-making and general efficiency.
For example, intelligence and surveillance, logistics, and command and control are all
military domains which stand to benefit from AI innovation. The Pentagon is perhaps the most
“far-along” in the sense of imagining, developing, and deploying AI solutions to its intelligence
and surveillance activities. This can be attributed to the large quantity of data sets available for
analysis, whether it be from human-gathering intelligence, satellite imagery, or drone
reconnaissance.151 AI could be used to augment or replace existing human analysis of military
intelligence, opening up the human capital previously devoted to manually searching through
video to other tasks, likely more cognitively-intense decision making.152 The DoD’s Project
Maven, launched in 2017, is an ongoing AI initiative which is exploring this potential use case
through the application of AI to the analysis of aerial drone footage in the Middle East, to be
discussed herein. Logistics is another realm of military operations which could stand to benefit
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from AI solutions. Predictive algorithms could be designed to alert support crews that a vehicle
needs service, drawing on real-time sensor data and other in-vehicle systems for probabilistic
analysis. This use case is already being driven by the Air Force for F-35 repair decisions, as
opposed to relying on user recognition of a malfunctioning jet or a standardized fleet
maintenance schedule.153 AI could also be used to supplement human analysis of cost savings for
army shipping and acquisition logistics, currently estimated to save the Army approximately
$100 million a year in shipping request optimization alone.154 The Army is pursuing this through
its Logistics Support Activity’s contract with IBM Watson, and officials hope to extend the
ability of its shipping request analysis from 10% capacity with human analysts to 100% capacity
with the assistance of AI.155
The implementation of AI solutions for command and control could perhaps prove to be
the most consequential for military decision-making. Currently, human officers conceive and
present potential weapons options to deploy against an adversary after analyzing battlefield
conditions in real-time. But defense officials like AI Chief Shanahan believe that in the future,
computers could speed up this process, providing “recommendations as fast as possible to a
human to make decisions about employing weapons.”156 Artificial intelligence would not replace
human cognition, as the technologies would only offer potential options to officers, but it could
enable faster adaptation to complex events, improving the quality and speed of wartime decision
making.157 In the near-term, the armed forces are looking at the potential of AI to “unify” its
disparate operations into a single dashboard. In other words, a “common operating picture” could
be created by synthesizing data from sensors across air, space, cyberspace, sea, and land
domains, providing a single display of friendly and enemy forces for military decision makers.158
The Air Force is currently working on the concept development for a Multi-Domain Command
and Control platform that would create such a dashboard, in collaboration with Lockheed Martin,
Harris, and several AI startups.159 These varying applications of defense AI all promise to make
the armed services more nimble, supplementing or improving human-assigned tasks while
allowing warfighters to devote their precious cognitive skills to more mission-critical objectives.
At the same time, a more agile military can also result in significant cost savings, with scarce
financial resources devoted to other needs.
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Artificial intelligence could also be used to enhance the lethality of the armed services
and even reduce casualties among its personnel. As noted, AI is principally imagined increasing
the speed of military decision-making, which can translate to greater effectiveness on the
battlefield.160 Semiautonomous and autonomous vehicles are also developing technologies with
artificial intelligence critical to realizing the full potential of their defense use cases. For
example, the Army is in the process of testing an automated gun turret, the Navy is pursuing
unmanned surface vessels for its “Ghost Fleet” concept, and the Air Force has advanced beyond
phase-2 tests for its “Loyal Wingman” program.161 These concepts all rely on AI to perceive the
environment, avoid obstacles, communicate with other vehicles and defense systems, and plan
navigation. These autonomous systems could, in theory, lower the risks for warfighters by
relying on these vehicles to enter particular combat zones or scenarios and also designing them
to “support” human personnel in their missions.162 The Loyal Wingman program, for instance,
pairs an uninhabited, older-generation fighter jet (e.g. F-16) with a human-piloted F-35 or F-22.
With AI, the Air Force imagines enabling the “loyal wingman” to perform tasks in conjunction
with its flight lead as a complementary asset or serve as a decoy to protect the crewed system
from offensive air defenses.163 Lastly, lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are “a
special class of weapon systems that use sensor suites and computer algorithms to independently
identify a target and employ an onboard weapon system to engage and destroy the target without
manual human control of the system.”164 These systems remain theoretical applications of AI, as
the armed services do not currently field any LAWS. However, the military remains open to
conducting research into autonomous weapons systems, as defense officials believe that the
military must respond to ongoing development of such systems by potential U.S. adversaries.165
Considering the uncertainty around the U.S. development of LAWS, and a lack of consensus
around the future trajectory of artificial intelligence itself, experts believe that the applications of
AI sketched out herein remain tentative.166
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5.3

An (ongoing) spin-on innovation: The effort to bring artificial intelligence to warfighting

What is behind the Pentagon's concerted interest in the development and deployment of
artificial intelligence? In the most basic understanding, U.S. officials are motivated by the logic
of the first-mover advantage: When a technology is first introduced, the actor who possesses it
may hold an important benefit over its competitors. As a technological advantage in war can
influence the outcome of any given conflict, the armed forces cannot afford to sacrifice their
technological edge.167 Potential American adversaries have not been coy about their grand
intentions for AI. As previously noted, China and Russia have both announced state-sponsored
development programs for artificial intelligence in 2017, tying it to the maintenance of their
national security. Vladimir Putin’s statement on AI has become quite infamous in the defense
and AI communities, arguing that “whoever becomes the leader in [the AI] sphere will become
the ruler of the world.”168 With the articulation of great power competition as the future of the
U.S.’s national security strategy, and the inevitability of China and Russia one day fielding
military AI capabilities, the logic for the Pentagon to develop its own AI programs is quite clear;
If the United States’ national security community fails to do so, it will find itself in an acute
disadvantage against its great power rivals.169 The strategic imperative then is for the U.S. to
maintain its military supremacy through the superior development and deployment of AI.170 It is
worth noting, then, that the military adoption of AI is occurring in the context of hypothetical
adversaries. While the United States currently has tense relations with Russia and China, the
country is not in an active state of war with these powers. This contrasts with defense biometrics,
which was developed and tailored to the operational environment of the War on Terror in the
Middle East, an important qualitative distinction that I will elaborate on in Part VI.
To start, it is important to acknowledge the historical role the DoD has played in the
development of AI as a field of study. The military provided funding for early AI and machine
learning research during the 1950s and 1960s, primarily through the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA).171 The Pentagon’s initial enthusiasm (and support) for the promises of AI
began to flag by the 1970s, as the push to shift funding from basic to applied artificial
intelligence projects for defense applications produced lackluster results. For example, the
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Speech Understanding Program was funded as a five-year, $3 million program in 1971 with the
end-goal of a speech recognition system that could attain a ten-thousand-word vocabulary.172 By
1976, DARPA administrators and the AI researchers disagreed over whether the “performance
criteria had been met;” a euphemism for a less-than-stellar program demonstration. The
Pentagon’s pursuit of AI remained elusive during the 1980s, with DARPA concluding that the
1983 Strategic Computing Program to develop “a new generation of computers that can SEE,
HEAR, TALK, PLAN, and REASON” was far too ambitious with existing technologies.173
While these early investments in AI research did not translate to a concerted adoption effort on
the part of armed services, they reflect the traditional role of the military in promoting basic
research into new technologies and the role it played in contributing to the amount of funding
and academic talent devoted to AI. Unfortunately for the Pentagon, both computational power
and the “intelligent” algorithms themselves remained too immature for the complex operational
visions defense officials had in mind; the DoD’s pursuit of artificial intelligence would have to
wait for the twenty-first century acceleration of AI capabilities among the technology firms of
Silicon Valley.
In this way, artificial intelligence in the twenty-first century can be best understood as a
spin-on innovation. The Pentagon turned to the private sector from the beginning of its efforts to
bring AI into the military in the early 2010s, and its leadership has been emphatic about the
essential role technology firms must play in the military’s adoption of AI technologies. AI Chief
Shanahan, for example, has stated how “commercial solutions are available for most of the
problems we’ve discovered in the past and will discover in the future [and] it is where some of
the world’s best talent resides right now.”174 Indeed, AI applications are necessarily dual-use,
with both military and consumer applications. This makes sense: An image recognition
algorithm trained to identify shoplifters using security camera footage could be similarly coopted by the military. Instead of training the algorithm on security footage, it could be used to
recognize terrorist activity in video footage recorded by drones in the Middle East.175 More so,
because the technology is still considered to be in its relative infancy, cutting-edge advances are
occurring in labs run by Silicon Valley companies and academic research universities, not
traditional defense contractors.176 It was in recognition of these realities that the Department of
Defense’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy explicitly called for a close collaboration between the
military and tech industry in order to procure the software and cloud computing technology
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necessary to realize defense AI ambitions.177 While the DoD stands to benefit from cutting-edge
private sector work on AI, the benefits do not flow one way. The military is a compelling partner
for technology firms, offering lucrative (and highly profitable) defense contracts and possessing
valuable data sets typically inaccessible to research universities or companies.178
Recognizing that the majority of expertise and talent in the field of AI resides in the
commercial technology sector, the Pentagon turned its sights to Silicon Valley. In 2016, the
Defense Innovation Board (DIB) was chartered as a federal advisory committee tasked with
“providing independent advice and recommendations on innovative means to address future
challenges and technology applications.”179 The DIB was conceived by then-Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter as part of the Third Offset Strategy, with the board designed to bring
military officials and leaders of the commercial technology sector closer together in areas of
emerging interest, first-and-foremost being artificial intelligence.180 Dr. Eric Schmidt, former
Executive Chairman of Alphabet, chairs the DIB, with members hailing from academic research
institutions and commercial technology companies such as Microsoft, Facebook, and Google.181
Artificial intelligence immediately became one of the DIB’s main priorities, with its members
issuing “Recommendation #5: Catalyze Innovations in Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning” in October 2016.182 Recommendation #5 calls for the military to harness the
capabilities of AI and ML to “ensure technology superiority the way DoD did with nuclear
weapons in the 1940s and with precision-guided weapons and stealth technology afterward.”183
This recommendation is an explicit reference to the Pentagon’s previous success in its First and
Second Offset Strategies, and a deliberate attempt at framing the importance of AI to the ongoing
Third Offset Strategy. More importantly, however, the DIB recommended that the DoD establish
a center for the study of artificial intelligence and machine learning, which would build expertise
in these areas across the Pentagon. The DIB envisioned that this center would also serve as the
military’s liaison with labs in the private sector and universities and as an educational source to
inform the armed services about the implications of AI technologies for military operations.
Recommendation #5 thus formed the framework for the Pentagon’s creation of the Joint
Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in 2018. From 2019 to 2020, the Defense Innovation Board
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also spearheaded the creation of the Pentagon’s Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence (to
be discussed further herein).184
The Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) was launched as the DoD’s “Center of
Excellence” on all artificial intelligence matters as the focal point of the Department’s AI
strategy.185 The JAIC’s mission statement is to “provide a critical mass of expertise to help the
Department harness the game-changing power of AI,” thus integrating technology development
with organizational change to ensure the successful deployment of AI across the armed
services.186 This mission is broken down into several key objectives: To accelerate the delivery
and adoption of AI, to scale the impact of AI across the Department, to develop partnerships with
industry, academia, allies, and partners, to cultivate a leading AI workforce, and leading in
military AI ethics and safety.187 The JAIC is housed within the Office of the Chief Information
Officer, and the unit is currently led by Director Lt. General Jack Shanahan and Deputy Director
Stephen T. Homeyer. The JAIC has the authority to vet all DoD AI projects requiring funding in
excess of $15 million, and it accomplishes this through two operational categories: National
Mission Initiatives (NMIs) and Component Mission Initiatives (CMIs).188 NMIs are the broad AI
capability delivery projects that the JAIC will run for problems which cross Military Services or
Departments.189 CMIs are more narrow projects tailored to a specific DoD Component or
Agency (e.g. no cross-functional capabilities required).190 They will be run by the respective
Component with support from the JAIC in the form of funding, data management, and AI
standards.
Shanahan has stated that the JAIC’s overriding prerogative will be to rapidly deploy
existing AI algorithms and tools, contracted from commercial technology companies for military
applications.191 The unit’s procedure for determining which AI projects to take on was
illuminated by Rachael Martin, the JAIC’s mission chief of Intelligent Business Automation
Augmentation and Analytics, in January 2020. Four principles will be followed in picking its AI
projects: mission impact, data-readiness, technology maturity, and “internal changemakers.”192
Mission impact involves an internal evaluation of “who cares” within the DoD, and an
assessment of the target user base that would adopt and potentially benefit from the AI
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technology. The second principle, data-readiness, seeks to determine where the data to be
analyzed is “clean” and prepared for the complex modelling required of AI algorithms.
Technology maturity relates to the JAIC’s mission to co-opt existing AI technologies for military
use. Indeed, according to Martin, they aim to identify “what already exists and is ready to be
deployed at this moment,” contrary to the impression of the unit as a R&D hub or base for
emerging, untested AI. Lastly, the JAIC seeks to understand who the “changemakers” within the
DoD will be. In other words, which officials or leaders will be the champions of the project,
working in collaboration with the JAIC throughout the development cycle of a particular AI
solution.193 The JAIC is currently pursuing its first projects meeting these criteria, including
Predictive Maintenance (PMX), Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), Cyber,
Joint Warfighting, Intelligent Business Automation, Augmentation and Analytics (IBA3), and
Warfighter Health.194 The Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) contract is also being
run by AI Chief Shanahan with the JAIC, as an enterprise cloud computing network spanning the
federal government is deemed essential to the full exploitation of AI systems (and the data they
run on) for national security users.195 It is believed that the Pentagon intends to dedicate $1.7
billion to the JAIC and AI projects over the next five years, a sizable war chest that will require
significant budget appropriations from a $268 million request for FY2020.196
While existing AI technologies are adopted by the JAIC, the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is charged with the development and
procurement of emerging capabilities. The Under Secretary, also known as the DoD’s Chief
Technology Officer, is thus responsible for the “research, development, and prototyping
activities across the DoD enterprise” to ensure the military’s technology superiority.197 The
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)
are two organizations which report to the CTO and are playing an important role in the overall
effort to adopt AI by focusing on early but promising advanced AI projects. As discussed,
DARPA has a storied history within the DoD’s innovation ecosystem, and it is not sitting on the
sidelines in the mission to translate AI technologies for military purposes. In September 2018,
the organization announced its “AI Next” campaign, a multi-year investment initiative to pursue
the “third wave of technological advance:” contextual adaptation. DARPA is devoting over $2
billion toward projects which advance beyond machine learning techniques towards contextual
reasoning capabilities — the ability of machines to acquire human-like communication and
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reasoning capabilities, with the ability to recognize new situations and environments and adapt to
them.198
The Defense Innovation Unit, on the other hand, is a recent addition to the DoD’s
technology acquisition capabilities, designed to be a kind of “Silicon Valley embassy” for the
armed services.199 It is focused on five technology areas — AI, autonomy, cyber, human
systems, and space — where the commercial sector is considered to be at the cutting-edge. Its
value-add in promoting AI adoption is two-fold: geographic proximity and rapid prototyping.
The DIU has offices in Silicon Valley, Boston, and Austin, providing it with a unique reach to
tap into the innovation ecosystems in the regions the Pentagon has typically been distant from
with its centralized bureaucracy in Washington, DC. More importantly, the Defense Innovation
Unit has the statutory authority to field and scale promising commercial technologies at
commercial speeds.200 In this way, the DIU can be best understood in the overall scheme of the
Pentagon’s AI efforts as a technology “scout” for potentially impactful AI technologies, linking
small firms with the JAIC and other DoD leaders to accelerate their development with the
ultimate objective of military adoption.
5.4

Project Maven: The Pentagon’s First “AI Experiment”

In April 2017, then-Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work announced the launch of an
Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team devoted to a new assignment: Project Maven.201
Led by Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan (who would go on to direct the JAIC) and Marine Corps Col.
Drew Cukor, Project Maven was conceived as the Pentagon’s first experiment in advanced AI
capabilities, a crash program designed to deliver AI technologies to the battlefield within six
months of its initial funding.202 The use case chosen for the experiment in defense AI was the Air
Force’s intelligence-gathering operations in Iraq and Syria in the United States’ ongoing fight
against the Islamic State (ISIS).203 The Air Force possesses tactical aerial drone platforms such
as the ScanEagle and the medium-altitude platforms such as a MQ-1C Gray Eagle and MQ-9
Reaper which collect many terabytes of data through their on-board video sensors. Traditionally,
it takes a team of analysts working around-the-clock to comb through a fraction of one drone’s
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sensor data.204 Project Maven, then, was created to help address the laborious analysis of aerial
drone intelligence, using machine-learning algorithms to automatically identify and label 38
classes of objects — images, buildings, and other landmarks — so Air Force analysts can
identify unique targets.205 The successful development of AI for drone intelligence analysis was
imagined by the Cross-Functional Team as the ability of one analyst to do “twice as much work,
potentially three times as much, as they’re doing now.”206 In other words, Project Maven would
automate low-level counting ability, freeing up valuable human capital for higher-value (and
more complex) analysis.207 For warfighters, the delay in human analysis and intelligence delivery
means an evolving battlefield; Project Maven would also provide actionable intelligence to
soldiers in the field in less time.208
The Cross-Functional Team turned to the commercial technology sector to source its
training and image-processing algorithms for Project Maven. Upon the unclassified release of the
AI project’s details, Col. Drew Cukor announced that the Pentagon had a relationship with a
“significant data-labeling company” that would provide services to allow DoD analysts and
engineers to label existing data and prepare it for machine learning.209 With Google as the vendor
of choice for Project Maven, the cross-functional DoD-commercial team had to first clean up the
Air Force’s vast trove of data in order for the image-recognition algorithms to be “trained.”210
The initial defense leaders in charge of the program also sought to structure Project Maven
correctly for a complex technical initiative like AI, using its ties to the Defense Innovation Unit
— still an experimental unit at the time — to partner with industry experts on how to properly
buy, field, and implement AI. With external counsel, Project Maven was modelled after project
management techniques considered industry-standard in commercial technology. This approach
calls for rapid product prototyping and iterative development by placing the developing
technology in the hands of the end-users it is being designed for. Project management is of the
utmost importance for AI development, as its essential tasks (e.g. labeling data, developing
computational infrastructure, developing and integrating algorithms) are completed iteratively
and in parallel.211 Indeed, Gregory C. Allen, adjunct fellow with the Center for New American
Security, has commented on the atypical development of Project AI compared to conventional
defense projects: “The developers had access to the end-users very early on in the process. They
recognized that [with] AI systems … you had to understand what your end-user was going to do
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with them… There was this iterative development process that was very familiar in the
commercial software world, but unfamiliar in the defense world.”212
The identity of the Pentagon’s contractor remained unknown until March 2018, when The
Intercept and Gizmodo unveiled the mysterious contractor to be Google. The company had
routed its formal relationship with the DoD through a Northern Virginia technology staffing
company called ECS Federal, obscuring its involvement in Project Maven.213 Upon the
disclosure of the Pentagon-AI relationship, Google employees condemned the project: Several
employees resigned and thousands more signed a petition condemning Google’s role in
developing “warfare technology.”214 Initial efforts by Google executives to contain the
controversy proved ineffective, as leaks demonstrated that senior leaders at the company saw
Project Maven as an opening to land both an annual $250 million contract and future AI work. In
response, Google executives declined to renew the Project Maven contract, even removing the
firm from contention for Project JEDI.215 Discontent at Google spread across the Valley, with the
Tech Workers Coalition — a labor rights organization composed of tech industry workers, labor
organizers, and community organizers — issuing a petition in April 2018 calling upon major
technology firms, including Amazon, Microsoft, and IBM, to refuse to take up Google’s role in
Project Maven.216 While major publicly-traded commercial technology firms passed on the
opportunity to take on the Project Maven contract, Silicon Valley leadership and its employees
were not united in opposition to defense AI work. Palantir has taken over from Google on
developing AI for drone footage analysis, and AI-startup Anduril Industries, led by Oculus Rift
founder Palmer Luckey, has also secured a contract with the Pentagon to work on virtual reality
battlefield-management systems.217
5.5

Implications for Future AI Adoption

Ultimately, Project Maven can provide valuable insights into how the Pentagon should
proceed with AI adoption for military needs. As AI Chief Shanahan has articulated about the
program, Project Maven is “designed to be that pilot project, that pathfinder, that spark that
kindles the flame front of artificial intelligence across the rest of the [Defense] Department.”218
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First, it is important to discuss some of the features of Project Maven that are likely to define the
DoD’s AI programs for the foreseeable future. Indeed, Maven is an example of the application of
artificial intelligence technology to increase the military’s speed and agility. Its program
directors envisioned the modification of commercial image recognition algorithms to assist Air
Force analysts in the laborious task of combing through video footage collected from military
drones. By applying AI, it is expected that the Air Force will be able to greatly increase the work
of its human analysts. Algorithms like the ones used to identify different classes of objects in
Maven also fall within the category of “narrow AI,” demonstrating how the Pentagon’s
foreseeable AI implementation will involve programs designed to perform a single task like
image recognition, outside of the more complex (and still immature) projects for machines to
realize “conscious” human intelligence.219
Additionally, the use case for Maven came out of already-existing AI applications in the
commercial technology industry, a reflection of the dual-use antecedents of Maven and other
emerging DoD AI projects with direct private technology antecedents. As JAIC officials have
expressed, the Pentagon will first prioritize what it deems mature AI to be— algorithms which
have been commercially-proven and can be translated to a defense application for accelerated
deployment.220 In this way, Maven is an important demonstration of the possibilities of DoDprivate sector technology collaboration on an emerging technology like artificial intelligence.
The Pentagon was able to form commercial relationships with both major Silicon Valley firms
(e.g. Google, Palantir) while also bringing small technology startups like Anduril on board
through vehicles like the Defense Innovation Unit. Indeed, Palmer Luckey himself attributed his
firm’s participation in Project Maven as benefitting from the DoD’s concerted outreach to nontraditional external partners. He attributes the DIU for demonstrating “that people in Silicon
Valley could actually get stuff into production, actually do work with the government... and
proving that you actually could get into [military work].”221
Both effective engagement with the tech sector and the successful deployment of Maven
itself required a transformation in the DoD’s organizational processes around technology
acquisition. In order to work and operate at commercial speeds, Maven had to be handled and
structured differently from traditional defense acquisition processes, which can last several years
with separated organizations defining technology specifications and a sequential “hand-off” of
results as each organization completes its activities, an approach deemed ineffective for digital
solutions.222 To start, the importance of cross-functional teams was illustrated by the original
Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, which detailed stakeholders and talent from its
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partners at Google and the DoD to both develop the AI software, ensure its technology
specifications matched Department needs, and to facilitate prototyping. Moreover, the guiding
idea behind organizing Maven was a project management approach, involving rapid prototyping
by delivering a minimum viable product (MVP) to end-users and incorporating their feedback
for further productive development. While project management has an extensive history in the
private sector, its use by the Pentagon remains quite new, and in this way, Maven began the
DoD’s experiment with a product development process more closely resembling the consumer
technology industry. Lastly, some of the capabilities developed for Project Maven, including its
own AI-ready infrastructure (e.g. computing clusters for graphics processing), can now be
leveraged for future algorithmic training for other JAIC projects.223 In sum, Maven helped to
build the institutional infrastructure and human capital required for AI adoption, paving the way
for a DoD that will be more nimble and adept at procuring, piloting, and fielding artificial
intelligence capabilities in the years to come.
While Project Maven demonstrated the possibilities for approaching the DoD’s AI
acquisitions, it also highlighted some of the challenges going forward — the most important
being the ethical implications of defense AI. As discussed, Project Maven suffered from the loss
of Google as its main technology partner after internal protests at the firm erupted over the
Maven contract. Google engineers disagreed with the decision to contract with the DoD on a
“warfighting technology,” and its withdrawal from the project, along with the negative
perceptions created around Maven, led some to believe that Google was the “canary in the coal
mine” for the Pentagon’s commercial sector relationships.224 In hindsight, the long-term
implications of the Google protests seem far less dire. Other technology partners like Palantir
and Anduril stepped into the Maven contract to maintain the project, with some Silicon Valley
firms even using the Google debacle to promote their own eagerness to contract with the DoD on
its future AI needs. This was the approach taken by Amazon, Palantir, and Anduril, with Palmer
Luckey penning an editorial in the Washington Post condemning Google for abandoning the
federal government as counterproductive and naive: “If tech companies want to promote peace,
they should stand with, not against, the United States’ defense community.”225 Despite its
withdrawal from Maven, Google itself has refused to renounce future work with the military on
AI, with Kent Walker, Senior Vice President for Global Affairs, conveying that “[Google]
continues to explore work across the public sector, including the military, in a wide range of
areas … in ways consistent with our AI Principles.”226
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AI Chief Shanahan has taken the Google controversy as a learning lesson for the DoD,
believing that some initial criticism over its AI adoption efforts was inevitable: “The fact that it
happened when it did as opposed to on the verge of a conflict or a crisis where we’re asking for
help, we’ve gotten some of that out of the way.”227 In other words, the Pentagon can respond to
the legitimate questions of defense AI ethics raised by the adoption of existing commercial
technologies for military purposes, and therefore learn and do better going forward in the
framing of its AI initiatives and collaborative dynamics with its private sector partners. For
example, the Pentagon has directly addressed the controversy at the root of Google’s withdrawal
with the promulgation of its AI Ethical Principles in February 2020. The Defense Innovation
Board led the development of the principles, which apply to the use of AI for both combat and
non-combat situations. The principles are as follows: DoD personnel will exercise responsibility
in the development, deployment, and use of AI capabilities; Equitability will be ensured by
taking steps to minimize unintended biases in AI programs; Defense AI will be traceable, with
transparent and auditable methodologies, data sources, and design procedures; Reliability will be
maintained with the DoD’s AI capabilities having explicit, well-defined uses with thorough
testing; and lastly, the department's AI will be governable, with the ability to detect and avoid
unintended consequences or shut down deployed systems which fail to work as intended. By
promising to adhere to these five key AI principles, the Pentagon hopes to both maintain a
standard of excellence in regard to its adoption and fielding of artificial intelligence, while also
convincing external stakeholders of the seriousness in which the military views the technology’s
ethical implications.
6.

6.1

A S S E S S I N G T H E T HI R D OF FS E T S T R AT E G Y :
CO NC L US I ON

R E C OM M E N DAT I O NS

A ND

From defense biometrics to defense AI: Lessons learned

Looking back on the case of defense biometrics, what lessons did the Pentagon learn
which translate to AI procurement? The importance of a clear use case for developing and
fielding a new technology for warfighting remains relevant. The operational need for biometrics
emerged from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, when warfighters expressed a need to ascertain
the identities of insurgents apprehended on the battlefield. At the same time as this operational
application was emerging, national security planners at the Pentagon and other think tanks like
the CSIS and RAND were elaborating on “identity dominance” theory, which expressed the
significance of the United States to harmonize identifications capabilities across the defense and
law enforcement agencies from the federal to the local level.228 In this way, defense biometrics
suggested that technology adoption benefits from the articulation of a compelling operational use
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case, while the framing of an “overarching ideology” like identity dominance can provide further
coherence to focus adoption efforts across the armed services.
The current trajectory of AI development suggests that the Pentagon is following a
similar playbook, whether it be deliberate or not. As Shanahan and other officials at the JAIC
have expressed, the Pentagon’s acquisitions strategy is emphasizing AI applications with clear
operational use cases. Project Maven, for example, identified an area where the military was
struggling to perform a task essential to its mission — intelligence analysis of drone footage —
and proposed modifying existing commercial AI technology to improve this operational
challenge.229 Also in line with the case of defense biometrics, the DoD has begun to put together
a common framework for its pursuit of AI, a tentative theory of military “speed and agility.”230
In other words, as previous technology initiatives like nuclear power and precision-guided
weapons heightened the destructive capabilities of the DoD, now artificial intelligence and other
developing technologies will allow the military to field more agile forces while increasing its
operational efficiency. With these commonalities in mind, it is important to distinguish where AI
remains behind that of biometrics — AI technology is not yet being fielded against defined
adversaries. While the push behind artificial intelligence has been strongly motivated by China
and Russia’s exploration of AI, these potential great power rivals remain hypothetical. On the
other hand, defense biometrics came to be adopted and tested against the rigors of real
opponents, with jihadist terrorists and other insurgents seeking to outwit the biometric
technologies being fielded by coalition forces. This in turn allowed DoD technology managers to
work with their commercial partners on devising more rigorous solutions, leading to more
effective capabilities on the battlefield.
As discussed in Part IV, defense biometrics conveyed the importance of prototyping a
new defense technology, particularly in the context of a “natural experiment.” For biometrics,
this natural experiment was the battlefield, where warfighters were given prototype biometric
products and feedback was collected on their suitability for counter-insurgency initiatives.
Warfighter feedback was then incorporated into the product’s development, thus creating
biometric technologies better suited to conditions on the ground. The Joint Artificial Intelligence
Center has been pursuing a similar strategy, considering its emphasis on project management
organizational techniques to rapidly deliver prototypes to DoD end users. AI Chief Shanahan has
expressed this methodology as starting with “50% solutions ASAP.”231 Project Maven and later
AI programs are following the private-sector best practices of a “field-feedback-fix-repeat” cycle
in response to the urgent demands from warfighters for AI capabilities, perhaps best articulated
by Shanahan himself: “I was in a room no more than a week ago with a group [special

229

See Vincent, Brandi. “How the Pentagon’s JAIC Picks Its Artificial Intelligence-Driven Projects.”

230

See Simonite, Tom. “The Pentagon Doubles Down on AI–and Wants Help from Big Tech.”

231

See Jr, Sydney J. Freedberg. “Joint AI Chief: Start With 50% Solutions ASAP.” Breaking Defense (blog), August 30, 2019.
https://breakingdefense.com/2019/08/joint-ai-chief-start-with-50-solutions-get-better-asap/.

47
operators], who were … pounding the tables, saying, ‘Just give us the capabilities. We know it’s
not perfect yet. We’re here to wring it out and tell you how to make it better.’”232
The “natural experiment” for artificial intelligence is less clearly defined, considering that
most planned AI applications do not imagine direct translation to the battlefield and the United
States is not engaged in active adversarial conflict with a great power rival. While the case of AI
may currently lack as comprehensive of a natural experiment setting as the War on Terror in the
Middle East, one could imagine many “mini-natural experiments” as each unique use case is
deployed to warfighters from the JAIC and its performance is evaluated and iterated upon. One
cautionary note for the unique technical basis of artificial intelligence is the reliance of the
software on the data it is “trained on.”233 In other words, can Project Maven’s image recognition
algorithms, trained on surveillance data from Iraq and Afghanistan, be used to successfully
discern key personnel or installations in an alternative context, such as a military conflict in
China? As Michael Horowitz, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania
states, there are “risks that algorithms trained on historical data might face battlefield conditions
that are different from the one it trained one,” a complication to the ideal situation of using one
particular program to generalize technical specifications and learnings to other potential
applications for rapid deployment.234
Lastly, both defense biometrics and artificial intelligence demonstrated the importance of
a “center of excellence” to coordinate technology acquisition, development, and integration
across the DoD. For example, both the Biometrics Fusion Center and Joint Artificial Intelligence
Center developed close external relationships with commercial technology vendors, selecting
among existing products those which could be best suited for military specifications. The Centers
worked with the different branches of the armed services on testing and evaluation and were
crucial to the prototyping and development process for their respective technologies. Of course,
the Pentagon’s efforts to integrate AI into warfighting could also be said to have benefited from a
consideration of the ethical implications of its adoption, which came to the fore with Google’s
exit from Project Maven. While defense biometrics largely avoided significant controversy over
its logging of biometric data in the Iraq and Afghanistan theatres, both cases illuminated how
technology adoption is best facilitated through an early and comprehensive formulation of ethical
standards.
6.2

The Third Offset in Perspective

The most important legacy of the Third Offset may be its success in re-orienting the
Pentagon toward the cutting-edge technological advancements of the commercial sector in areas
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like biotechnology, robotics, and most importantly, artificial intelligence. The Defense
Innovation Board has provided the Pentagon access to significant thought leaders in Silicon
Valley and other innovation hubs around the country, including academic practitioners and
executives in private industry. Indeed, the DIB has made important contributions to the Third
Offset and the Pentagon’s acquisitions efforts, including its recommendations to create an “AI
hub,” which led to the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center being stood-up in 2018, and its
spearheading of the Artificial Intelligence Ethical Principles in 2020. The Defense Innovation
Unit, one of the institutional innovations of the Third Offset for the Pentagon’s procurement
efforts, has also proved to be a valuable link connecting warfighters to firms with AI expertise,
signified by its role in drawing potential vendors to Project Maven and other ongoing DoD
investments.235 Both developments as part of the Third Offset have brought the Pentagon and the
commercial technology sector closer together, with demonstrated successes in the effort to field
AI for defense use cases.
Similarly, tentative insights can be drawn from the reforms to Pentagon procurement and
acquisition policies to facilitate prototyping of commercial technologies for “spin-on” adoption.
Other Transaction Authority (OTA) is being piloted by both “new” units like the DIU and JAIC
and “old” units like DARPA. Active use by these organizations within the DoD suggests that
internal stakeholders are interested in utilizing the new procurement authorities to improve the
acquisition process, and the use of accelerated contracting by the DIU and JAIC to bring AI
capabilities to the Air Force within six months after contracting in Project Maven suggest that
these reforms are working as intended, increasing the speed at which commercial partners can
develop, deliver, and iterate on prototypes meeting military specifications. The OTA and other
modifications to acquisition policies have also expanded DoD relationships to firms outside of
the conventional contractor base, as seen in the case of ongoing artificial intelligence adoption.
For example, the DIU’s use of the Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO) as a competitive
solicitation process for problems facing warfighters, followed by the awarding of an OT for
prototyping, allows the Defense Innovation Unit to work with vendors it may not have onceconsidered in a fast, flexible, and collaborative process, broadening the vendor base available to
the Pentagon.236 Moreover, the flexibility these OTA contracts provide to commercial partners
allow these firms, used to operating in the speed and relative “freedom” of the private sector, to
avoid the burden of abiding by unfamiliar and at-times byzantine Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) policy.237 While a more definitive and systematic assessment may have to wait as further
data is collected on the success (and failure) of ongoing technology adoption initiatives, in
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allowing the military to more closely reach acquisition speeds typical of the commercial sector,
the Third Offset can be judged to have reached one of its key expressed objectives.
Of course, the acquisition of new technologies is only half the battle; the cases explored
herein illuminated how other concerns unrelated to the procurement of the technology itself can
come into play in the successful adoption of a given innovation. There is more to fielding a new
technology than “buying it.” The impact of the Third Offset on this “non-acquisition” facet of
military innovation remains inchoate, considering the heavy emphasis on expanding the DoD
vendor base and rapid fielding of new prototypes thus far — all related to the acquisition process
itself.
One of the first, and most important lessons, was revealed by the study of defense
biometrics: The significance of a guiding framework or “ideology,” to organize and make sense
of the efforts to field a new technology. “Identity dominance,” for example, brought the diffuse
efforts of the Pentagon, FBI, Homeland Security, and other agencies to bring biometrics to their
respective missions together to consider how their programs could align and communicate across
traditional institutional walls. Calls for an “all-of-government” effort to apply AI to the federal
government could spark a similar push outside of existing intra-agency efforts. At the moment,
the Pentagon’s overarching emphasis on “getting faster” is unifying artificial intelligence
initiatives across the branches of the armed services. Defense biometrics and AI point to how an
articulated reform program like the Third Offset Strategy cannot provide a guiding framework
like identity dominance or agility in and of itself; these paradigms must be produced and initiated
by organizational leaders outside the scope of an “offset strategy.”
A use case can be explored and a potential commercial product with a dual-use potential
identified, but what comes next? A given technology must be piloted through rapid prototyping,
ideally in a “natural experiment” setting. The Third Offset Strategy deserves commendation
here for changes to procurement reforms which have made it easier for commercial technology
companies to provide prototypes to program managers, such as the OT for Prototypes. However,
the contractual capability alone is insufficient; DoD units themselves must be dedicated to the
prototyping process — Warfighters must be content with receiving a 50% solution to their
operational challenge, and the leaders of the armed services interested in fielding AI solutions
must understand the role they can play in providing user-driven feedback for iterative product
development.
The importance of a project management approach to accelerating technology adoption
relates to the significance of organizational dynamics within the DoD, which the Third Offset
Strategy has begun to promote with new units stood-up like the DIU and JAIC and procurement
reforms to facilitate prototyping. Similarly, the DIB has recommended that the Pentagon
embrace a “culture of experimentation,” establish an Office of the Chief Innovation Officer,
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reward bureaucracy busting, and conduct innovation and technology training for senior DoD
leaders.238 These proposals all share the same motivation: to promote an organizational
environment which emphasizes risk-taking and creativity. If the Pentagon is to continue its
pursuit of cutting-edge commercial technologies, some of which will surely fail or struggle to
realize their promised application, then DoD officials must not fear punishment or ignominy if
the innovation initiative they champion stumbles. As General John E. Hyten — Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council — has
expressed, this culture of experimentation is ever-more important considering how many
emerging technologies will be software-based. In remarks to an audience at the CSIS in January
2020, he remarked that risk aversion among senior leaders has proliferated across the Pentagon’s
acquisition programs, undermining the speed at which the DoD buys and builds software.239 At
the same time, he argued that altering buying procedures alone for software and other emerging
technologies, as the Third Offset has prioritized to this point in time, is insufficient for a
requirements process “built for tanks and aircraft carriers.”240 While a less risk-averse
requirements process remains a concept for future discussion, Hyten raises a valid point: The
organizational dynamics of innovation are equally as important to technology acquisition, and
the Third Offset Strategy must pay closer attention to how the armed services are integrating and
fielding new technologies post-procurement.
Lastly, it is worth remarking that non-institutional factors, such as the ethical
implications of a commercial technology co-opted for military purposes, are worth considering
during the “spin-on” process. Defense biometrics raised the issue of military ethics as the DoD
received mild criticism over its mass collection of personal biometric data of innocent civilians
and terrorists alike. Artificial intelligence more clearly demonstrated the potential perils of
failing to address the ethics of an emerging technology applied to warfighting, as the wellpublicized internal Google revolt led to the firm’s withdrawal form Project Maven. While these
dynamics outside of the “immediate” organizational scope of the armed services are impossible
to fully envision with a reform program like the Third Offset, the challenges they can pose to
potential defense innovation initiatives makes it worthy of the attention of senior Pentagon
officials. In other words, by championing technologies like AI for defense purposes, military
leaders should be vigorous in maintaining an early dialogue with internal and external
stakeholders and be forthright about questions over its ethics for warfighting.
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6.3

Conclusion

Defense biometrics illuminated the Pentagon’s acquisition of an existing commercial
technology for military purposes during the War on Terror, while the pursuit of defense artificial
intelligence is an ongoing effort by the armed services begun in earnest with the onset of the
Third Offset Strategy in the 2010s. Both cases can be placed within the twenty-first century
context of innovation as technologies first targeted for commercial end-users, and later adapted
by the Pentagon when military applications became apparent. In other words, biometrics and
artificial intelligence are quintessential “spin-on innovations,” and for this reason, their case
studies of successful and ongoing adoption, respectively, provide a useful lens in which to
answer the question posed at the beginning of this Article: is the Pentagon still capable of
discovering and promoting the technological innovations of the future?
While the military finds itself in an altogether different innovation context in the twentyfirst century than when it pursued advanced nuclear technology or precision-guided weapons
during the First and Second Offsets of the twentieth century, I argue that the Department of
Defense has begun to successfully respond to these changed circumstances in the form of the
Third Offset Strategy. New organizations like the Defense Innovation Unit and Defense
Innovation Board have brought the Pentagon and the commercial technology sector closer
together, while alternative methods of contracting like the Other Transaction Authority (OTA)
and Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO) have expanded the vendor base available to the
armed services and increased its ability to practice rapid prototyping of new technologies.
The Pentagon has begun its effort to adopt next-generation AI capabilities by turning to
the commercial technology sector, and it is deploying these new institutional tools created for the
Third Offset in its effort to woo private tech leaders in Silicon Valley and elsewhere to develop
innovative technologies for the armed services. While the DoD is in the early stages of executing
its Artificial Intelligence Strategy, it has become apparent that the Joint Artificial Intelligence
Center and other Pentagon leaders interested in AI are relying on the products of the Third Offset
— the Defense Innovation Unit, the Defense Innovation Board, and the Other Transaction
Authority/Commercial Solutions Opening — in their aspiration to procure, develop, and field
artificial intelligence solutions at commercial speeds.
Using defense biometrics as a case study for a successful “spin-on” innovation, modest
recommendations were offered for both the Pentagon’s development of AI and for the Third
Offset Strategy more generally. These recommendations largely focused on the dynamics of the
spin-on process after “buying” the technology, including the importance of a guiding framework
or ideology for the translation of a new innovation to warfighting, rapid prototyping in a “natural
experiment” setting, organizational dynamics promoting experimentation and creativity, and
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awareness of non-institutional factors like military ethics which can impede technology
development.
In sum, the Third Offset Strategy is not simple rhetoric. There is reason to believe that the
U.S. military’s innovation edge can be maintained through the reform program of the Third
Offset. As its ideas have outlasted its initial promulgation by Secretary Carter during the Obama
Administration, successive DoD Secretaries — Jim Mattis, Patrick Shanahan241, and Mark Esper
— have maintained their commitment to bolstering the innovative capabilities of the armed
services, by promoting further acquisition reforms, expanding funding and capabilities to the
Defense Innovation Unit, and leaning on the Defense Innovation Board to assist in the framing of
the AI Ethical Principles. Even if the Trump Administration has let the organizing terminology
of the “Third Offset” fall into disuse in recent years242, the consensus among senior defense
leaders and lawmakers is firmly rooted: The adoption of cutting-edge commercial technologies
from the private sector — the “fourth channel” of the spin-on innovation — is of paramount
importance in an era of resurgent great power competition in the twenty-first century; it is no
exaggeration to say that the future of American military superiority depends on it.
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